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This dissertation examines the effect of two hallmarks of modern market structure, dark 
trading and fragmentation. The first chapter looks at the effects of dark trading on market quality 
on an ordinary trading day. Our research design is predicated on a regulatory pilot spearheaded by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. We leverage this setting to examine what happens to 
liquidity and price efficiency following a large negative exogenous shock to dark trading. The 
second chapter investigates the effects of dark trading and fragmentation on the resiliency of stocks 
facing an aggregate market shock. Prior literature has found cross sectional variation, based on the 
characteristics of liquidity suppliers, regarding what happens to market quality during a market 
downturn. However, due to prior data limitations we do not know how stock resiliency is affected 
by where a stock trades. Using newly available public data provided by FINRA, I characterize the 
locus of trading for all stocks across dark and lit trading venues (termed the “liquidity map”) and 
use this information to explain cross sectional variation in market quality following a negative 
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Two prominent features of US equity markets are dark trading and fragmentation. Over 
the past two decades, dark trading is estimated to have grown from 5% to 40% of volumes. As 
volumes have migrated off exchange, trading has also become increasingly disperse over a 
fragmented marketplace. For example, in 1993 NYSE executed 79% of shares in listed firms, but 
only 30% in recent years, with the remaining volumes spread over 14 exchanges, 32 dark pools, 
12 internalizers, and countless other brokers in the upstairs market (based on executions during 
December of 2018). Regulators view the proliferation of dark trading and fragmentation as a 
serious concern, despite ambiguity within academic research as to how these facets of market 
structure effect investing outcomes.  
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the effects of dark trading on market 
quality on a typical trading day. Our research design leverages a regulatory pilot spearheaded by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Within this setting, we isolate our analysis to one 
provision of the pilot (Trade-At) to examine how a large negative exogenous shock to dark 
trading impacts market quality.  
The second chapter investigates the effects of dark trading and fragmentation on the 
resiliency of stocks facing an aggregate market shock. Prior literature has found cross sectional 
variation in liquidity dislocations during a market downturn based on characteristics of liquidity 
suppliers. However, the effects of where a stock trades on its resiliency is unknown due to data 
limitations. Concerns about dark trading and market fragmentation prompted regulators to make 
a highly granular dataset available that discloses dark trading statistics. My study is the first to 
ask what we can learn about stock resiliency from where stocks trade. This question was 
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previously unanswerable using public data. I fill this gap in the literature using publicly available 
data provided by FINRA to map out individual stock patterns and use these characteristics to 



























CHAPTER I: DARK TRADING VOLUME AND MARKET QUALITY:  
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Abstract  
We exploit an exogenous shock to dark trading volume in order to identify the effect of dark 
trading on market quality. Following a 34% reduction in dark trading volume, we find that the cost 
of trade (e.g., effective spreads, realized spreads, price impact, and quoted spreads) does not 
change. While our findings stand in contrast to those of prior studies, a number of supplemental 
tests confirm that conflicting inferences cannot be attributed to different stock samples or time 
periods. Our research highlights the benefit of structured experimentation from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for understanding causal effects in capital markets.  
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 Introduction to Chapter I 
Dark trading, which occurs on platforms that do not display orders prior to execution, 
accounts for roughly one-third of all equity trading volume in U.S. markets.2 Yet as dark venues 
aggressively compete for market share and traders decide how best to fulfill the fiduciary task of 
order routing, basic questions regarding the consequences of trading “in the dark” remain 
unanswered. The current lack of understanding fuels an intense policy debate concerning market 
structure. Regulatory bodies worldwide, tasked with protecting overall trader welfare, are 
considering and/or implementing policies to curb the use of dark venues. For example, European 
policymakers restricted dark trading to 8% of overall trading volume via MiFID II rules beginning 
in March 2018.3 At the current time, regulators in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Hong 
Kong are debating similar policies.  
Economic theory offers opposing predictions for how dark trading might influence market 
outcomes. Theoretical models argue that dark trading may damage overall market quality (e.g., 
wider spreads, higher volatility, and less efficient prices) by segmenting informed from 
uninformed order flow (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1998; Madhavan 1995; Zhu, 2014). Bolton, Santos, 
and Scheinkman (2016) offer the similar message that cream-skimming (i.e., selectively routing 
uniformed order flow to dark venues) is harmful. Likewise, the availability of dark venues may 
detract from liquidity externalities that arise in a centralized market (Mendelson, 1987). On the 
other hand, the proliferation of dark trading might enhance the overall quality of equity markets 
                                                 
2 Dark venues include more than 60 different alternative trading systems (ATS) and internalized trades at hundreds 
of broker-dealers. Statistics on dark trading volume are obtained from BATS Global Markets for the month of July, 
2017: https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_share/ . Recent reports from the TABB Group point to a higher 
fraction of dark trading volume (44.9%), but include hidden orders in lit markets in this total: 
https://research.tabbgroup.com/report/v15-034-tabb-equity-digest-q2-2017 
3 See discussion in Davies and Sirri (2017).  – p, 28. 
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by increasing competition across venues (Economides, 1996; Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000) 
or amongst informed liquidity suppliers (Boulatov and George, 2013). Dark venues may also 
inhibit predatory trading activity by allowing traders to hide their intentions (Harris, 1997). 
Ultimately, the question of how dark trading affects market quality is an empirical one. 
While the question is both relevant and straightforward, answers are not. The central problem is 
identification, since trading on dark versus lit venues is the endogenous outcome of a complex 
trading landscape. Simply put, traders choose execution strategies that may include routing orders 
to dark venues based on expectations of trading costs, future market conditions, and many 
unobservable constraints. So while empirical studies use various econometric corrections to obtain 
inference (e.g., instrumental variables, selection bias corrections, etc.), one must recognize the 
inherent difficulty in establishing a causal relation within the “complex ecosystem” in which 
securities trade.4 Not surprisingly, the body of empirical research lacks a cohesive message. 
Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2014), Weaver (2014), Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015), 
Hathaway, Kwan, and Zheng (2017; hereafter “HKZ”) find evidence of increased transactions 
costs and diminished market quality as dark trading volumes rise. In stark contrast, O’Hara and 
Ye (2011), Jiang, McInish, and Upson (2012), Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2016), Foley and Putnins 
(2016), and others associate greater levels of dark trading volume with significant improvements 
in transactions costs, price efficiency, and execution speeds. 
Our contribution lies squarely on identification. We exploit a large exogenous shock to 
dark trading that arises from the SEC’s ‘Tick Size Pilot’ enacted in October 2016. The pilot, 
                                                 
4 Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Equity Market 




designed to examine liquidity for smaller firms, increases the tick size (to one nickel) for stocks in 
three randomly assigned treatment groups and holds constant the trading environment of an equal 
number of control firms. Our experiment detracts from the pilot’s primary focus and instead 
utilizes a nuanced distinction between two of the pilot’s treatment groups – Group 2 (G2) and 
Group 3 (G3). While the pilot restricts quoting and trading to nickel increments for stocks in 
treatment groups G2 and G3 alike, it imposes an additional restriction on stocks in G3. This 
additional restriction, commonly called the Trade-At rule, prohibits a venue from executing a trade 
at the National Best Bid or Offer quote unless it is the venue displaying that quote. Instead, it must 
either offer a five-cent price improvement or route the order to the venue with the best quote.5 
Since dark facilities do not display quotes, the provision reduces the competitive position and 
market share of these venues.  
We summarize our experiment in three pictures that describe G2 and G3 stocks during the 
forty trading days surrounding October 2016, when the Pilot was implemented in a staggered 
fashion. Figure 1 (Appendix C) reveals that the average fraction of stock-level trading on dark 
venues drops by four standard deviations, from 35% to 23% in G3 stocks. In contrast, dark trading 
in group G2 rises slightly.6 Figure 2 displays a similar plot for effective spreads, a common 
measure of transactions costs. Despite the large shock to dark trading around the event, there is no 
discernible change in the difference in effective spreads between the two groups of stocks. Finally, 
Figure 3 plots a market quality measure based on variance ratios, which changes only slightly 
                                                 
5 In Appendix A, we provide an example of how Trade-At affects order routing. 
6 A negative spike in dark trading is observable for both treatment and control stocks during the pre-pilot period 
depicted in Figure 1. The spike coincides with the third Friday of September, known as "Triple Witching Day", when 
derivatives expire for equities and equity indices. The steep drop in the share of dark trading is driven by a large 
increase in overall trading (52.13%) that dominates a modest increase in dark trading (5.31%).  
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around implementation. On their face, these results suggest that trading on dark venues has a 
largely benign effect on overall market quality. 
We test the veracity of our ‘inference from pictures’ using formal statistical tests. 
Specifically, we implement a difference-in-difference framework in which G3 stocks serve as the 
“treatment” group and G2 stocks are the “control” group. For each stock, we construct daily firm-
level observations over the twenty days before and the twenty days after the pilot’s staggered 
implementation during October 2016. The dependent variables that we analyze include spread 
measures – effective spread, quoted spread, realized spread, and price impact – along with an intra-
day variance ratio to evaluate price efficiency. 
Our regressions provide no evidence that the large exogenous shift in dark trading volume 
causes a change in effective or quoted spreads. When investigating the components of the effective 
spread – the realized spread and price impact – we find a similar result. In fact, the only variable 
that appears affected is the variance ratio. The variance ratio measure for G3 increases by 0.0185  
(t-statistic=1.81) when compared to G2. This marginally significant change is modest evidence of 
a loss to price efficiency following restrictions on dark trading. 
We conduct a rigorous set of exercises to demonstrate the validity of our experiment. First, 
we verify that stocks in groups G2 and G3 are similar across a number of characteristics (i.e., firm 
size, trading volume, share price, etc.). We then offer statistical evidence that differences in dark 
trading and our market quality variables between groups G2 and G3 are stable during the period 
leading up to the Pilot’s enactment. This evidence confirms the parallel trends assumption, which 
is key for inference in differences-in-differences analyses. 
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We next demonstrate that the pilot does not meaningfully alter other stock characteristics 
that possibly correlate with market quality. The treatment effect (i.e. “Trade-At”) on variables such 
as turnover, trade size, and price is economically small and typically statistically insignificant. 
Motivated by recent work from Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2018), we also investigate 
the treatment effect on inverted venues. These authors argue the sub-penny price improvement 
offered by inverted-fee venues is particularly attractive when similar execution opportunities are 
not available in the dark. We show that even though the inverted venue share of total trading 
volume increases for G3 stocks, the majority of this change is attributable to trades that shift from 
dark to lit venues being proportionally allocated across all lit venues. We also show a large drop 
in dark trading but no significant change to market quality among stocks where the tick size 
constraint did not bind. This results mitigates concerns over a confounding inverted fee venue 
effect because Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2018) argue those venues are less important 
for non-tick constrained stocks.  
In closely related work, Comerton-Forde, Malinova, and Park (2018) analyze Canada’s 
minimum price improvement rule that was imposed in 2012. Using proprietary trader-type data, 
these authors show that the rule mainly redirected retail order flow from a single dark pool (that 
resembles a U.S. retail wholesale execution venue) to the lit market with the lowest take fee. In 
essence, the rule forced the previously-segmented retail order flow back into the lit markets; 
consequently, liquidity providers shifted to lit markets as well. The latter result improved lit depth, 
though in aggregate, liquidity was largely unaffected. Devani, Anderson, and Zhang (2015) reach 
similar conclusions and also note there was no change in measures of informational efficiency.7 
                                                 
7 Foley and Putnins (2016) use publicly available data to study the same minimum price improvement rule, and they 
argue that dark trading improves liquidity. However, Comerton-Forde, Malinova, and Park (2018) show in their 
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Our main insights and contribution are incremental to those gleaned from the Canadian 
rule change. The U.S. tick pilot program contained an exemption by which wholesalers and 
exchange retail liquidity program participants could price improve retail orders by a half penny 
from the best bid or offer for stocks in both our treatment and control groups. A second exemption 
allowed venues to price blocks of at least 50,000 shares or $100,000 trades at the best bid or offer 
and at penny increments. Thus, unlike the migration of retail flow that occurred in Canadian stocks, 
we expect the tick pilot to redirect non-block institutional volume from dark to lit venues. As such, 
our analysis complements that of Comerton-Forde, Malinova, and Park (2018) and Devani, 
Anderson, and Zhang (2015) to suggest Trade-At rules have an immaterial effect on market 
quality. 
We investigate the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we include control 
variables in our difference-in-difference regressions that aim to capture order characteristics 
related to expected trading costs. Second, because prior studies have found differential effects for 
dark trading when looking at different subsamples of stocks, we parse our sample along multiple 
stock characteristics and repeat the difference-in-difference analysis. Specifically, we divide 
stocks in our sample by market capitalization, quoted spread, turnover, fragmentation across lit 
venues, and whether the tick size constraint is binding. Finally, we exploit newly disclosed FINRA 
data to decompose dark trading into that occurring on Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) and 
non-ATS venues. While we find a few subsamples with economically and statistically weak 
evidence that dark trading either harms or improves market quality, the common message is that 
                                                 
Online Appendix that this conclusion is driven by the inclusion of six to twelve relatively illiquid stocks and 
obfuscated by the potential mis-classification of one-sided versus two-sided markets. 
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given the size of the shock to dark trading, detectible changes to transaction costs and price 
efficiency are marginal at best. 
We reconcile our results with others in the literature who conclude dark trading deteriorates 
liquidity. Notably, HKZ (2017) use a 2-stage procedure to control for selection bias and find that 
a 10% rise in dark volume leads to a 9.2% increase in effective spreads. Our message is quite 
different as we find a larger shock to dark trading has no effect on liquidity. One possibility is that 
our different sample period and sample of stocks (our sample is skewed towards smaller stocks) 
are responsible for the stark difference in conclusions. With this in mind, we replicate HKZ during 
both their original sample period using their sample of stocks and during our sample period using 
our sample of stocks. In both replications we find results that are quantitatively and qualitatively 
similar to those reported by HKZ. Thus, our differences with HKZ are not driven by our stock 
sample or time period. Rather, they are more reasonably attributable to differences in our 
respective identification strategies. Our work and replication highlights the inherent difficulty in 
selecting instruments and the importance of structured experimentation from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for understanding causal effects in capital markets. 
An important caveat is in order. Dark venues are typically associated with both a lack of 
pre-trade transparency and a finer pricing grid (e.g., subpenny executions) when compared to lit 
exchanges.8 The nature of our experiment isolates the effect of pre-trade transparency because 
stocks in both groups are subject to the same five-cent pricing grid. We view this as a strength of 
our approach because any study of market structure that isolates individual aspects provides a 
cleaner set of guidelines for regulators and those who experiment with future market design. In 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that post-trade transparency differs also, in that while all trades are publically disseminated in 
real-time, only lit trades are reported with a specific venue where the execution occurred. 
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this sense, our analysis is complementary to studies such as Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2015), 
who analyze tick size changes on lit exchanges as a stock’s price moves above and below one 
dollar, and Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2018), who highlight the role of inverted fee 
venues, as those papers can better speak to finer changes in the pricing grid.  
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the SEC’s tick size 
pilot, Section III summarizes our data, Sections IV and V discuss our research design and results, 
and Section VI concludes. 
Natural Experiment: SEC Tick Size Pilot  
The 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) directed the SEC to assess 
how decimalization affects the liquidity and trading of smaller capitalization companies. The 
directive stems from a concern that decimalization reduced incentives to make markets, produce 
sell-side research, and underwrite public offerings in smaller firms. Advocates of a wider minimum 
tick size argue that under such a policy market making would be more profitable, sell side analysts 
would increase coverage, and institutions would be more likely to invest in smaller firms. In 
response, the SEC implemented the “Tick Size Pilot” in October of 2016, which increased quoting 
and trading increments from $0.01 to $0.05 for randomly selected samples of small- and mid-
capitalization stocks. Rindi and Werner (2017) discuss the background leading up to the SEC’s 
tick size pilot program and provide a comprehensive analysis of pilot stocks verses controls. They 




Stratifying by market capitalization, volume weighted average price, and average daily 
volume, the pilot randomly assigns approximately 2,400 stocks to a control group and three 
treatment groups9: 
 Treatment Group 1 (G1) - stocks must be quoted in nickel increments; 
 
 Treatment Group 2 (G2) – same treatment as G1, plus stocks must also trade in nickel 
increments or at a half-nickel midpoint. 
 
 Treatment Group 3 (G3) – same treatment as G2, plus stocks are subject to the Trade-At 
provision, which prohibits a venue from executing a trade at the “Best Protected Bid” 
(NBB) or “Best Protected Offer” (NBO) unless it is displaying that quote.10  
 
The treatments for G1 and G2 clearly align with the JOBS Act directive as they change the 
pricing grid from pennies to nickels. In contrast, the additional treatment effect in Group 3, 
commonly known as a Trade-At provision, specifies that any trading venue not displaying 
protected quotes (e.g. all dark venues) cannot execute at the inside quote (NBB or NBO) – 
effectively shifting trade from dark to lit venues.11  
We exploit the nuanced difference between Group 3 and Group 2 stocks to identify an 
exogenous shock to dark trading volume. Dark venues’ inability to execute trades at the prevailing 
inside quote coupled with the coarser pricing grid (improvements to the inside quote must be at 
least five cents) should result in a significant transfer of trading volume from dark to lit trading 
venues. Moreover, comparing effects between Groups 3 and 2 holds constant the pricing grid, thus 
isolating any pure “dark trading” effect. The exogenous shift in trading volume, random 
                                                 
9 The complete SEC Tick Size Pilot plan is available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nms/2015/34-74892-exa.pdf 
10 Appendix A provides three examples of Trade-At from the SEC implementation plan. 
11 There are several exemptions from Trade-At, all of which generally follow exemptions to RegNMS Rule 611 
(“trade-through”).  Trade-At exemptions include block trades, fractional shares, trades during a locked market or self-
help condition, trades part of a non “regular way” contract (i.e. not settled T+3), and stop trades. In addition, retail 
price improvement is exempt from pilot trading rules provided the inside quote is improved by at least a half penny. 
However, it is unclear how any of these exemptions might bias inference from our study.  
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assignment of stocks into treatment groups, and the existence of a suitable counterfactual group 
(G2) present an unparalleled opportunity to study the causal effects of dark trading on market 
quality.  
 From the onset, controversy surrounded the inclusion of a Trade-At provision in the Tick 
Size Pilot. The SEC noted very clearly the relevance of the Trade-At provision when directing 
exchanges and FINRA to submit a tick pilot plan: 
The Commission believes that if trading volume in Test Group Two Pilot Securities moves 
to undisplayed trading centers, then including the trade-at requirement in Test Group Three 
could test whether trading remains on lit venues and what impact, if any, the migration of 
trading from lit venues to dark venues would have on liquidity and market quality for the 
Pilot Securities… (SEC, 2014, p. 36846). 
 
As exchanges have long advocated tests involving a Trade-At provision (Lynch, 2015), it is 
perhaps not surprising the Pilot included this feature. Operators of dark pools naturally voiced 
strong opposition: 
We see no connection between the goal of the Pilot – widening tick sizes to determine the 
impact on small cap issuers and their securities – and the imposition of a Trade-At 
Requirement which is simply a measure to increase market share for [lit] exchanges 
(SIFMA, 2014). 




A stock’s eligibility for the Pilot program was determined over a “measurement” period 
from April 4 until September 2, 2016 in accordance with the following criteria: 
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 National Market System (NMS) common stocks trading publicly for at least six months 
prior to the beginning of the pilot 
 Market capitalization of no greater than $3 billion 
 
 Closing price of at least $2.00 on the last day of the measurement period 
 
 Closing price of at least $1.50 on each day during the measurement period 
 
 Average daily volume (ADV) of no greater than one million shares 
 
 Volume weighted average price (VWAP) of at least $2.00 
 
On September 3, 2016, the SEC published a list of 2,398 stocks that met the eligibility 
requirements and assigned each stock to three different tercile groups based on market 
capitalization, volume weighted average price, and average daily volume. These tercile 
assignments produce 27 unique fractile portfolios.12 Stocks were then randomly drawn from these 
fractile portfolios and assigned to one of the three mutually exclusive treatment groups (targeting 
400 stocks in each group) as described in Section II. The random draw also forced the same 
distribution across listing exchanges within treatment groups. The result was group assignments 
for 2,395 stocks in the pilot, with 400 in one treatment group and 398 in the other two treatment 
groups. Remaining stocks comprised the control group.  
We obtain a daily list of Pilot stocks, their corresponding group assignments (i.e. control 
group, G1, G2, or G3), and the effective date for each record from the listing exchanges (NYSE 
and NASDAQ).13 From the list, we retain only G3 and G2 stocks and identify 789 unique firms 
                                                 
12 Portfolios containing less than ten stocks were combined with other portfolios containing under ten stocks until 
each portfolio contained at least ten stocks.  
13 Listing exchanges provide daily lists that reflect any updates to the sample groups that might arise from mergers, 
delistings, etc. A list of pilot stocks is also available from FINRA: www.finra.org/industry/tick-size-pilot-program. 
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during the period from September 2, 2016 until November 29, 2016. 14 After matching each firm’s 
ticker symbol with CRSP to obtain exchange listing, sharecode, shares outstanding, and trading 
volume, we filter the sample to include only common shares (sharecode=10 or 11), leaving 667 
unique firms.  
We gather data necessary to construct measures of market quality (spreads, price impact, 
and variance ratios) as well as several control variables used in our regressions from the NYSE’s 
daily millisecond trade and quote data (TAQ). To ensure the integrity of the TAQ data, we match 
trades and quotes following Holden and Jacobsen (2014) and exclude all trades executed before 
9:30 am or after 4:00 pm, as well as those associated with the opening or closing auctions.15 We 
also exclude executions exempt from the RegNMS Rule 611 (also known as the trade through 
rule), because these trades are not necessarily related to the prevailing quote at the time of the 
trade.16 After requiring sufficient TAQ data to compute market quality measures each day, we are 
left with 660 firms in the final sample, of which 327 are from group G3 and 333 are from group 
G2. 
 We identify dark venue executions as those with exchange code ‘D’ in TAQ.17 This 
‘flagged’ dark trading volume includes all trading within dark pools (i.e. registered alternative 
trading systems, ATS) as well as internalized trades at broker-dealers.18 To assess the prevalence 
                                                 
14 Dates for our study are chosen to ensure four weeks of market data before and after the staggered implementation 
of the ‘Tick Size Pilot’, which occurred from October 3 to 31, 2016. 
15 Trades that occur outside of the regular trading session are coded in TAQ with trade condition T or U. Auction 
trades are coded with trade conditions O and 6 on all exchanges except for NYSE. For NYSE listed securities the first 
and last regular session trades, which are not stop orders, executed with exchange code “N” identify NYSE auction 
trades.  
16 For example: stop, derivatively priced and prior reference price trades. 
17 This measure excludes executions against hidden orders on exchanges. 
18 We retain RegNMS exempt trades since these reflect trader decisions and without them we would have an 
incomplete picture of order flow allocation. Thus our measure encompasses all regular trading session transactions 
executed against undisplayed trading interest away from any exchange.  
17 
 
of dark trading volume for each stock and day, we calculate the dollar value traded in dark venues 
scaled by total traded dollar value (DarkTrading). This proportion based measure, which serves as 
our primary independent variable of interest, is common in empirical studies of U.S. stocks (e.g. 
O’Hara and Ye, 2011; Hatheway, Kwan, and Zheng, 2017).  Degryse, De Jong, and Van Kervel 
(2015) compute a similar measure to analyze dark trading in Dutch stock. Market Quality 
Measures 
To assess market quality, we calculate daily spread measures and variance ratios using 
intraday trade and quote data from TAQ. Our spread measures include both quoted and effective 




,            (1) 
where NBO and NBB reflect the national best offer and bid price respectively, and midpoint is a  
 
simple average of the two.  For each stock-day, we compute a time-weighted average of the quoted 
spread to ensure that longer persisting spreads are more heavily weighted than fleeting quotes.  
While quoted spreads are often viewed as an accurate estimate of the cost of small market 
orders (Anand, et al, 2012), we also proxy for the realized cost of trade by calculating effective 
spreads. The effective spread (ES) compares the execution price of a trade to the prevailing 
midpoint at the time of trade, as follows:  
ES = 2 ∗
   (                )
         
           (2) 
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If the midpoint is a “fair price”, then the effective spreads measures a trader’s willingness to pay 
for immediacy. 
We decompose the effective spread into the realized spread (RS) and price impact (PI).  
RS =         ∗ 2 ∗
                  
         
                 (3) 
PI =         ∗ 2 ∗
            	         
         
                 (4) 
In the above equations, price is the price of an execution, midpoint is the average of the NBO and 
NBB, t is the time a trade occurred, and BuySell equals 1 (-1) if the trade is buyer (seller) initiated 
following the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.19  
Realized spreads compare the execution price at time t with the midpoint at a later time (t 
+ s). We choose 5 minutes for s, which is a common choice in the literature (see, e.g., Hendershott, 
Jones, and Menkveld, 2011). This variable is a proxy for compensation to market makers or other 
liquidity providers. The other component of the effective spread, price impact, captures a given 
trade’s effect on the stock price. The comparison of a future midpoint to the prevailing midpoint 
at the time of the trade allows us to infer the permanent price change attributable to a given trade. 
For each firm-day, we compute dollar-weighted averages for effective spread, realized spread, and 
price impact. 
The final measure that we construct, the variance ratio, focuses on how efficiently stock 
prices incorporate new information. To the extent that stock prices fully and immediately impound 
                                                 
19 We modify the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm following the DTAQ procedure outlined in Holden and Jacobsen 
(2014). Specifically, we lag quote observations by one microsecond, exclude quotes that indicate a locked or crossed 




new information, one should expect stock returns to follow a random walk and the variance in 
returns to scale linearly over time. Under these assumptions, the variance ratio (VR) serves as a 
viable proxy for price efficiency (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988). Specifically, we look at the ratio 




− 1)            (5) 
We capture the variance of midpoint returns over 30 (15) minute periods as Ret_var30 
(Ret_var15). If prices follow a random walk, the variance of 30-minute returns should be twice 
that of 15-minute returns, and VR should be zero.   
Given the nature of microstructure measures, throughout our analysis we winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the relevant sample.20 We include a 
comprehensive list of all variable definitions in Appendix B. 
Summary Statistics 
In Table 1 (Appendix D) we present pooled summary statistics for our treatment and 
control stocks. 
Variables are measured during the twenty trading days before the ‘Tick Size Pilot’ began on 
October 3, 2016. In this period, pilot stocks and their corresponding groups were publicly known, 
but the various treatment effects had not yet been imposed. We calculate a time series average 
measure for each stock over the twenty-day period and report the cross-sectional average across 
all stocks in the sample. Average trade size, dark block trades, depths, market capitalization, traded 
value, and VWAP are reported as dollar values.  
                                                 
20 Results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent when winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
20 
 
Table 1 confirms that sample stocks are small- to mid-capitalization firms with mean and 
median market capitalization of $614 million and $346 million, respectively. Stock price (VWAP) 
has a mean of $22.10 and an interquartile range of $8.60 to $29.72. Nasdaq-listed firms account 
for 73% of the sample and 26% of firms are listed on the NYSE. The average trade size for our  
sample stocks is $2,555. Quoted spreads average 80 basis points ($0.12), while the average 
effective spread is 50 basis points ($0.07).  We also find that dark trading accounts for a sizeable 
fraction of sample firms’ trading activity and is consistent with commonly-cited estimates for all 
stocks. The mean (median) value for the percentage of dark trading volume is 34% (32%) with an 
interquartile range of 26% to 41%. 
Empirical Analysis 
Research Design 
Our research design exploits differential treatments across groups G2 and G3 in the ‘Tick 
Size Pilot’. This setting naturally lends itself to a difference-in-difference framework since the 
only difference between the two groups is the Trade-At provision imposed on G3. Thus, any effects 
purely derived from the Trade-At provision should be detectable by differencing market quality 
measures between groups G3 and G2. Henceforth, we refer to G3 stocks as “treated” stocks, G2 
stocks as “control” stocks, and the post-implementation period as the “treatment” period.  
In our main analysis below, we estimate the following regression model using daily stock-
level data: 
  ,  = 	    + 	      +	        +	      ∗       + 	   ,  + 	  ,  
Variables designed to measure aspects of market quality (e.g., quoted spreads, effective spreads, 
etc.) are represented by Y. Stocks in the treatment group (G3) have TA equal to one and control 
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stocks (G2) have TA equal to zero. The indicator variable Post equals one after the ‘Tick Size 
Pilot’ is implemented and zero otherwise. Thus, our coefficient of interest,   , captures the 
marginal effect of treatment on G3 stocks. The vector X contains a set of control variables we 
expand upon below. To the extent that stocks’ assignment to G2 and G3 is random, the vector of 
control variables should not be necessary. Because the ‘Tick Size Pilot’ was implemented in 
staggered fashion between October 3 and October 31, 2016, we drop observations during the 
implementation period and consider the twenty trading days prior to October 3 as the pre-period 
and the twenty trading days following October 31 as the post period.21 
Parallel Trends Analysis 
Because clean identification is critical for valid inference, we conduct a rigorous set of 
exercises to demonstrate the validity of our experiment. The first question we address is whether 
stocks across the treatment (G3) and control (G2) groups systematically differ.  The stratified 
random sampling method employed by the SEC to assign stocks into various groups provides 
reasonable confidence that stocks across these groups are similar. Nevertheless, we empirically 
test for differences across G3 and G2 during the twenty trading days leading up to the treatment 
period, and present our results in Table 2.  
Table 2, Panel A shows that DarkTrading is similar across treated and control stocks at 
34.4% and 34.0%, respectively (p-value of the difference = 0.66). We also compare characteristics 
used by the SEC in the stratified random sampling procedure (i.e. market capitalization, traded 
volume, and price). Mean differences of these variables confirm that the SEC’s random assignment 
effectively controls for these variables - none are significantly different across groups. We report 
                                                 
21 We drop the shortened trading day on the Friday after Thanksgiving, November 25th, 2016. 
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differences in mean values of other trading environment variables in Panel B and our main market 
quality measures (e.g., effective spreads, quoted spreads, etc.) in Panel C. Only four of the of the 
twelve variables tested show marginally significant differences – dark block trades, effective 
spread, price impact, and quoted spread. For example, percentage effective spreads in G3 are  
stocks, and differences for both effective and quoted spreads are significant at the ten percent level. 
While the mean values for several of our variables of interest differ between groups (e.g., 
effective and quoted spreads), our tests do not require (for valid inference) these levels to be 
identical during the pre-treatment period. What is required is that these variables display parallel 
trends during the pre-treatment period – i.e., the differences across groups are stable (Roberts and 
Whited, 2013). Visual inspection of Figures 1-3 suggests this to be the case for our main 
independent variable, DarkTrading, and two key market quality variables, effective spread and 
variance ratio. In particular, we are interested in the green line that plots the difference between 
treatment (G3) and control (G2) groups over the pre-treatment period.  
We formally analyze these trends by estimating the model: 
  ,  = 	    + 	       +       
 ∈(  ,  )
+     	   ∗	    
 ∈(  ,  )
+   ,  (7) 
 
where TA equals one for treatment stocks (G3) and zero for control stocks (G2), and Wτ references 
a time dummy variable for each of the three weeks prior to the pilot period (the intercept captures 
the fourth week). For our purposes, the most important coefficient estimates in the regression are 
the interactions between TA and the week indicators (W).22 Since the estimate for    captures the 
                                                 
22 Hastings (2004) uses a similar framework to analyze trends in gasoline prices around the vertical integration 
between retail gas stations and refiners.   
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average difference between groups, insignificant interaction terms (λ) would indicate constant 
trends across groups in each week during the pre-Pilot period. As reported in Table 3, this is indeed 
what we find. Across both dependent and independent variables of interest, we only find one 
interaction coefficient (out of the eighteen that are tested) that is statistically different from zero. 
For example, while DarkTrading drops and spreads increase during the third week prior to  
the Pilot (as indicated by the significant W-3 term), the changes are similar across groups G3 and 
G2—the W-3 * TA interaction term is insignificant.  Overall, our findings suggest both that the SEC 
tick size pilot does not suffer from any obvious sample selection issues, and that it satisfies the 
requirements for parallel trends.  
Main Analysis 
The most striking feature of Figure 1 is that DarkTrading for treated stocks (G3) drops 
from 35% of value traded to about 23% on the first day of the pilot regime. In stark contrast, 
DarkTrading for control stocks (G2) increases slightly. To put the magnitude of this shock into 
context, we note that the time-series standard deviation of DarkTrading is 3% during the pre-
period. Thus, the treatment represents a shock exceeding four standard deviations. In addition to 
being large in magnitude, the difference in dark trading, between treatment and control, persists 
through the end of the 20-day window. We estimate our main differences-in-differences 
specification using DarkTrading as the dependent variable and present the results in the first 
column of Table 4. The effect of treatment on the treated is contained within the coefficient 
estimate for TA * Post. Consistent with Figure 1, the interaction coefficient reveals dark trading in 
G3 dropped by 12.1% (p-value<0.001). This move represents approximately a 34% decline from 
pre-treatment levels and validates our identification strategy. Moreover, if dark trading has any 
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impact on market quality, we deem a shock of this size more than sufficiently powerful to uncover 
the effect.  
 The sharp contrast between Figure 1 and Figures 2 and 3 succinctly summarizes our main 
message. Simply put, the shock to dark trading at the Pilot’s initiation is not mirrored by any 
meaningful economic change to market quality metrics. Figure 2 shows effective spreads widen, 
which is not surprising given the five-fold increase to the minimum tick size for each group. More 
importantly, spreads change to a similar degree for both groups. Likewise, Figure 3 shows little 
change to the variance ratio for either treatment or control samples. Overall these graphs present 
clear visual evidence of a shock to dark trading, but little indication of differential impacts to 
market quality between treatment and control. 
We estimate Equation (6) with market quality measures as the dependent variable and 
present the results in the remainder of Table 4. The second through sixth columns of the table 
report coefficient estimates from Equation (6) with no controls, where our dependent variables 
include effective spread (ES), quoted spread (QS), price impact (PI), realized spread (RS), and the 
variance ratio (VR). Consistent with the findings of Rindi and Werner (2017), effective and quoted 
spreads rise for treated and control stocks after quotes and trades are required to occur in nickel 
increments. The point estimates for the Post dummy coefficient are 17.8 basis points and 25.4 
basis points for effective and quoted spreads, respectively. However, our primary interest is the 
coefficient on TA * Post, which describes the unique effect of Trade-At. Confirming the patterns 
in Figures 1 and 2, the introduction of Trade-At leads to a precipitous decline in dark trading 
volume but no discernible effect on effective or quoted spreads. The interaction coefficients are -
0.47 basis points and 2.97 basis points, both indistinguishable from zero. 
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We also investigate the components of the effective spread – the realized spread and price 
impact. The dramatic shift in dark trading could potentially affect either. Changes in competition 
for liquidity provision would likely manifest in realized spread, which is commonly viewed as a 
proxy for market making profit. Forced pooling of informed and uninformed order flow could 
drive changes in price impact, a common proxy for adverse selection. The results in Table 4 reveal, 
however, that neither measure is affected by the negative shock to dark trading. While realized 
spread and price impact increase statistically for each group of stocks, the coefficients on TA * 
Post are both insignificant. The only market quality variable that appears to be affected is the 
variance ratio, which increases by 0.0173 (t-statistic=1.88) for G3 when compared to G2. While 
this change is only marginally significant, this is modest evidence of a loss to price efficiency 
following restrictions on dark trading. 
These main results are surprising in light of the intense policy debate on dark trading. The 
sharp exogenous drop in dark trading has no impact on the cost of trade. These results stand in 
stark contrast to those in HKZ (2017), who argue dark trading is detrimental to overall market 
quality. They are somewhat more in line with of O’Hara and Ye’s (2011) message that dark trading 
has neutral to slight positive economic effect on market quality. 
 While our primary regressions produce valid inference under the assumption that stock 
assignments to G3 and G2 are random, we attempt to bolster confidence in our tests by including 
a number of control variables in our difference-in-difference specification. Control variables 
include market capitalization, price, and trade size, which O’Hara and Ye (2011) show to be related 
to dark trading, and trading volume, which is known to be related to spread measures. We note 
that the SEC stratified the sample based on three of these four variables, so the sample selection 
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already accounts for them in part. We also follow HKZ and select additional control variables that 
aim to capture inputs to trading decisions. 
Variables that might influence the trading decision include the existence of large blocks of 
liquidity (DarkBlocks), volatility (Volatility), and asymmetric information (PIN). The potential to 
trade against a block in dark venues might attract order flow. If there are any systematic 
relationships between the expected cost of an order and the availability of dark block liquidity, we 
must control for block trades (DarkBlock) to avoid attributing such effects to dark trading in 
general. Another important factor that may influence order routing is trading risk, broadly defined 
as the risk that orders will execute at disadvantaged prices due to adverse selection or the 
combination of poor timing and extensive volatility. Orders that are riskier to trade typically 
generate higher implementation costs. If traders route more orders to lit venues when trading risk 
is high, then a relationship between risk and transaction costs could be erroneously attributed to 
dark trading. HKZ emphasize that these controls directly influence inferences, so we include their 
measures to control for trading risk. The first is a volatility measure (Volatility) and the second is 
the probability of informed trading (PIN). The construction of all additional control variables is 
detailed in Appendix B.  
 The remaining five columns on the right side of Table 4 report the same difference-in-
difference regression with the addition of controls discussed above. With added control variables, 
our results are nearly identical. We still find no impact to trading costs with a modest reduction in 
price efficiency, though only marginally significant. These findings imply dark trading has no 
discernible impact on the cost to trade. 
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Potential Confounding Effects 
While our results show that the dramatic change in dark trading has no impact on market 
quality, we also consider alternative explanations for the mostly insignificant results. For example, 
it is possible that dark trading affects market quality, but the large shock we study also influences 
other aspects of the trading landscape that generate equivalent but offsetting effects. We explore 
the possibility of confounding effects by estimating Equation (6) for a host of trading 
characteristics as the dependent variable. We report the results in Table 5, which contrasts the 
sharp drop in dark trading volume to changes in other important variables that might be related to 
market quality.  
For ease of comparison, we again display the estimates for DarkTrading in the first column 
of Table 5, Panel A. Subsequent columns reveals no significant treatment effect (TA * Post) for 
stock price (VWAP).  While Turnover and TradeSize are associated with a statistically significant 
treatment effect, the economic magnitude of the change is quite small. Specifically, Turnover 
decreases by about 4 basis points relative to the control group, from a pre-treatment average of 59 
basis points. Trade size for the treated group declines significantly by $93 compared to the control 
group (the pre-treatment average is $2,841). Juxtaposed against the drop in dark trading volume, 
these effects are quite small in magnitude and unlikely to materially change market quality.  
A more specific concern is that Trade-At alters the competitive landscape among lit venues, 
as discussed in the introduction. Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2018) describe how 
inverted fee venues’ gain a competitive advantage by offering potential sub-tick price 
improvements, particularly when the tick size is discrete and dark trading is constrained. Indeed, 
they show that inverted venue share increased for the Trade-At group under the Tick Pilot and 
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argue that any effect of dark trading on market quality may be confounded by an inverted venue 
share effect.23 In Figure 4, Panel A, we corroborate this result by showing inverted venue trading 
as a share of total trading increases substantially for group G3 relative to G2. We estimate (6) and 
show in Table 5, Panel B that inverted fee venue share (InvShare_all) increases by 3.35%, and this 
change is statistically significant. 
However, this finding may arise mechanically from the dramatic decline in trading on dark 
venues. If trading that shifts from dark to lit venues is simply allocated across various lit venues 
according to their pre-Pilot market share, every lit venue’s post-Pilot share of total trading will 
increase. Whether the shift in trading from dark to lit venues is disproportionately allocated to  
inverted venues is an important empirical question that might affect our inferences. To address this 
issue, we compute inverted venue trading as a fraction of lit exchange volume (InvShare_lit). We 
plot daily values of this variable for groups G3 and G2 around the Pilot in Figure 4, Panel B. The 
relative change in the re-computed inverted venue share is visually smaller than the shift depicted 
in Panel A.  
We test for statistical differences by estimating (6) with inverted share of lit trading 
(InvShare_lit) as the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate is approximately cut in half to 
1.61%. While statistically significant, the coefficient’s economic magnitude is small relative to the 
similar coefficient explaining dark trading. The change in inverted share is (1.61% / 12.42% =) 
13% of its pre-Pilot mean. We also note that both groups G3 and G2 have a substantial increase in 
inverted share of lit trading as the coefficient estimate for the Post dummy is 9.33% and highly 
significant, which represents a (9.33% / 12.00% =) 78% increase relative to the pre-Pilot mean. 
                                                 
23 Cox, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2017) find that trades and orders migrate from maker-taker to inverted fee venues 
for stocks with tick size increases. 
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Thus, any competitive advantage of inverted venues appears more manifest by the increased tick 
size that occurs for both groups, where trades must occur at nickel increments or greater than 
through an incremental effect of Trade-At. We associate the first order effect of Trade-At with 
changes to dark volume, not to inverted venue competitiveness. We revisit the importance of 
inverted fee venues in our Subsample Analysis in section below. 
A second specific concern is that researchers have found a positive relationship between 
lit fragmentation and liquidity (Degryse, De Jong, and Van Kervel, 2015). If Trade-At induces a 
reallocation of orders among lit venues (inverted venue effects aside), such that relative market 
shares change, then confounding inferences could emerge. The extent to which trading activity 
amongst lit venues changes is an empirical question. To offer a more holistic glimpse of how 
Trade-At affects trade dispersion across lit markets, we estimate the model with lit fragmentation 
(Fragmentation) and the number of lit venues (LitVenues) as dependent variables. Our 
fragmentation measure is similar to the Herfindahl metric in Degryse, De Jong, and Van Kervel 
(2015).24 We calculate an inverse Herfindahl Index using the market share of dollar volume per 
displayed venue. The lower bound of this measure (one) indicates all trades occurred within a 
single venue, while the upper bound is the number of lit venues and would indicate equal market 
share across them. 
For the Fragmentation measure, the interaction coefficient is 0.10 and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, indicating trading becomes slightly more disperse on lit venues. This 
effect is economically small, as the point estimate is about one-eighth of the standard deviation 
                                                 
24 Degryse, De Jong, and Van Kervel (2015) use one minus the HHI calculation, whereas we use one divided by HHI. 
Our modification allows for an intuitive interpretation of the variable as trading split evenly across n venues will have 
a value of n. 
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reported in Table 1. The LitVenues result is similarly small, but opposite in direction. While the 
number of lit venues show a significant drop, the economic magnitude of 0.08 fewer lit venues is 
economically trivial. For a trade-based fragmentation measure (not reported), the coefficient on 
TA * Post is economically quite small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. We interpret 
the regressions in Table 5, Panel B as evidence that treatment reduced dark trading and that 
whatever order flow was reallocated among lit venues did not materially alter the relative 
allocation of trades among lit exchanges. Collectively, the results in this section enforce the 
feasibility of using the Trade-At pilot as a natural experiment and bolster our conclusion that dark 
trading has no causal effect on market quality. 
Replication of HKZ 
 Earlier studies have been limited to drawing inferences about dark trading without the 
benefit of a natural experiment. Without an exogenous shock, these studies have attempted to 
control for potential endogeneity in the form of reverse causality and selection bias. O’Hara and 
Ye (2011) employ a two-stage Heckman selection model. HKZ augment this method by adding 
variables to control for traders’ expectations regarding trading risk. Importantly, the inference 
obtained by HKZ is starkly different than ours – that dark trading harms market quality. 
Given the differences in our findings, we explore the possibility that differences either in 
the time period or the sample of stocks considered (our sample is skewed towards smaller stocks) 
are responsible for the stark difference in conclusions. Specifically, we replicate HKZ during both 
their original sample period using their sample of stocks and during our sample period using our 
sample of stocks. For the replication in our sample period, we pool G3 and G2 stocks during the 
pre-pilot period. As in HKZ, we estimate both a simple OLS regression and a two-stage Heckman 
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procedure. While results are similar across both specifications, we concentrate our discussion on 
the Heckman procedure in the interest of brevity. 
The first stage of the Heckman selection model is a probit model that predicts DarkTrading 
and includes independent variables that might influence the trading decision such as DarkBlocks, 
volatility (Volatility), and the probability of informed trading (PIN). This first stage facilitates the 
calculation of an inverse mills ratio that, when included in the second stage, corrects for the 
possibility that traders allocate their orders between lit and off exchange venues based on the 
difficulty of the order. We present the results in Table 6. For both the OLS model and the two-
stage model, DarkTrading loads highly significant and positive, implying dark trading increases 
effective spreads. To interpret marginal effects, a 10% shock to DarkTrading predicts effective 
spread will increase 4.46 bps. In both replications, the estimated marginal effect is almost identical 
(both quantitatively and qualitatively) to that reported by HKZ. Thus, our differences with HKZ  
cannot be driven by our stock sample or time period. Rather, they are more reasonably attributable 
to differences in our respective identification strategies.  
This comparison of methods highlights the challenge of empirical research within the 
trading landscape. While OLS analyses likely produce biased coefficient estimates because of 
endogeneity problems, the Heckman correction model may not sufficiently mitigate these 
concerns. For the Heckman correction to be correctly specified, there must be at least one unique 
regressor in the first stage regression that is correlated with the suspect variable (e.g. dark trading) 
but does not incrementally affect the second stage dependent variable (e.g. effective spreads). Our 
work and replication highlights the inherent difficulty in selecting instruments and the importance 
of structured experimentation from the SEC for understanding causal effects in capital markets. 
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As beneficiaries of such pilot programs, we hope regulators continue to make use of natural 
experiments to shed light on causal relationships within market microstructure. 
Subsample Analysis 
 Previous studies show differential effects from dark trading in subsamples. Despite our 
sample being limited to smaller stocks, there is a chance the relationship between dark trading and 
market quality is concentrated in one particular set of stocks, and pooling all stocks introduces 
noise that prevents precise inferences. In this section, we analyze subsamples of stocks based a 
number of stock characteristics to sharpen our tests.  
Trading Environment Subsamples 
O’Hara and Ye (2011) find that their main results, from a 2008 sample of dark trading, are 
not homogeneous across listing exchanges or market capitalization subsamples. Similarly, HKZ 
report that stocks with wide versus narrow quoted spreads respond differently to dark trading 
volume. In an effort to flesh out our result, we divide stocks into terciles based on a number of 
different stock characteristics such as firm size, quoted spread, and trading activity. We sample 
these variables over the second quarter of 2016, which precedes the announcement of the Pilot 
groupings.  
We estimate regression Equation (6) for the top and bottom tercile groups of each variable 
and present the coefficient for the interaction term (TA*Post) in Table 7. As before, we also present 
the interaction coefficient for DarkTrading in the first column to reveal the magnitude of the shock. 
In each subsample that we analyze, treatment stocks exhibit a substantial drop in DarkTrading 
relative to control stocks ranging from about -10% to about -13%. Thus, in all cases, we expect 
the shock to provide sufficient power to detect effects on our outcome variables.  
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Subsamples based on firm size (MktCap) and QuotedSpread reveal almost no evidence of 
changes in effective or quoted spreads following the shock to dark trading volume.  While liquidity 
coefficients are uniformly negative for high turnover stocks and mainly positive for low turnover 
stocks, only three of the eight coefficients are statistically significant (two are significant only at 
the 10% level). Taken together, these various subsample results lack any cohesive message. 
We also consider variation in the lit trading environments across stocks. Such variation 
may matter because the shock to dark trading that we exploit effectively pushes activity from dark 
to lit markets, and prior research argues that certain lit market characteristics affect market quality. 
Degryse, De Jong, and Van Kervel (2015) associate lit market fragmentation with greater depth 
and tighter spreads in their sample of Dutch stocks. They argue that competition across visible 
limit order books and the commensurate increase in the number of liquidity suppliers drives these 
improvements. We split the sample according to Fragmentation, which is an inverse Herfindahl 
Index of trading across lit venues. Stocks in the top Fragmentation tercile are those for which pre-
pilot lit market trading was most dispersed. Degryse et al’s conclusion suggests an improvement 
to liquidity in the top Fragmentation group because dark trading will shift to a highly competitive 
lit market. The results in Table 7 are directionally consistent with this prediction, though none of 
the changes to liquidity measures for high Fragmentation stocks are statistically significant. In 
contrast, for the low Fragmentation group spreads significantly increase after the shock. Thus, 
when volume shifts from dark venues to highly concentrated lit markets, liquidity degrades, also 
consistent with the competition story. 
Another prominent feature of modern lit markets is the proliferation of inverted fee venues. 
By offering sub-penny rebates to liquidity demanders, these venues facilitate trades within the 
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NBBO at a finer pricing grid. This fee structure is particularly attractive under a Trade-At rule that 
effectively precludes dark executions at the NBBO. Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2018) 
report that inverted venue market share indeed increases for G3 stocks, especially for stocks where 
the nickel tick is a binding constraint, and they associate instrumented inverted venue trading with 
better liquidity and informational efficiency. We divide our sample into stocks where the nickel 
constraint does and does not bind. We assign to the binding tick size group stocks with average 
quoted spread below five cents during the second quarter of 2016, and we assign all others to the 
non-binding group.  
Comparing our results for the binding and non-binding groups offers relevant insights. We 
see from Table 7 that effective spreads fall by about 6 bps (t-statistic=1.93), and changes in realized 
spreads are also statistically significant at the 10% level. But since Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and 
Zhong (2018) argue that liquidity improvements arising from inverted fee venues are concentrated 
in the binding tick constraint stocks, it is difficult to disentangle whether the drop in effective 
spreads that we document can be attributed to a reduction in dark trading or an increase in trading 
on inverted venues. Fortunately, the non-binding group provides a cleaner picture. The  
finer pricing grid offered by inverted fee venues is less important for these stocks, so analyzing 
this subsample highlights a large shock to dark trading (approximately -11.6%) while mitigating 
concerns of a confounding inverted fee venue effect. The results for this subsample are consistent 
with the overall message from the full sample that dark trading has little meaningful effect on 
market quality; coefficients differ in sign across measures, and only one (price impact) is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Decomposing Dark Trading Variable 
Our analysis thus far treats all dark trading as homogenous. This choice follows other 
papers studying U.S. data (e.g., O’Hara and Ye, 2011 and HKZ) and stems from the fact that TAQ 
data identifies trades that occur off the lit exchanges (Exchange Code = “D”) with no clarification 
on where they execute. Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015) similarly categorize dark trading 
in Dutch stocks. Because numerous types of off-exchange trading venues exist -  dark pools, 
internalizers who purchase retail order flow, and broker-dealers facilitating institutional block 
trades – this treatment of the data might add noise if the effect of dark trading varies across venue 
types.  
Several studies of non-U.S. dark trading that have the ability to utilize more granular data, 
either explicitly or implicitly reference dark pools. A key example is Comerton-Forde and Putnins 
(2015), who analyze dark trading in Australia. Since payment for order flow is prohibited in 
Australia and these authors account separately for block-size trading, the dark order flow they 
study likely resembles that in U.S. dark pools. These authors conclude that high levels of non-
block dark trading are harmful to market quality, while low levels are either beneficial or benign. 
In our final analysis, we exploit a new dataset to study stocks where dark pool activity is most 
prevalent. 
FINRA began releasing weekly execution volume by stock for every ATS in the U.S on 
May 12, 2014 and similar data for non-ATS venues on April 4, 2016. We download these datasets 
and compute two new weekly variables, DarkTrading_ATS and DarkTrading_nonATS that 
decompose a weekly version of our main DarkTrading variable.25 The former is share volume 
                                                 
25 We explore the accuracy of our DarkTrading decomposition by comparing the difference between weekly trades 
reported by FINRA (ATS plus non-ATS trades) to TRF trades as reported by TAQ (including opening and closing 
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across all ATS platforms scaled by total share volume from TAQ, and it proxies for trading in dark 
pools. The latter, defined as non-ATS share volume scaled by total TAQ share volume, captures 
internalized retail and institutional flow. 
On average, ATS and non-ATS venues both contribute meaningfully to dark trading. The 
pre-pilot means of DarkTrading_ATS and DarkTrading_nonATS are 13.6% and 22.6%; the 
respective standard deviations are 9.2% and 18.9%. Figure 5, Panel A displays DarkTrading_ATS 
for treatment and control stocks during the four weeks before and after the pilot implementation. 
The x-axis of this figure represents weeks rather than days (as in Figure 1) since the FINRA ATS 
data is aggregated to the weekly level. Panel B displays an analogous plot for 
DarkTrading_nonATS. One clear result is that both types of dark trading fall dramatically around 
the Pilot. Compared to the control group, stocks in the treatment group experience a 6.5% drop in 
DarkTrading_ATS and a 5.1% drop in DarkTrading_nonATS.  
We attempt to isolate the effect of trading in dark pools using two sorting variables. First, 
we split sample into terciles according to DarkTrading_ATS, once again using data from the 
second quarter of 2016. Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015) identify a “tipping point” of around 
ten percent, above which dark trading is harmful. Thus, insofar as our DarkTrading_ATS sort 
separates stocks on either side of a similar tipping point, we hypothesize the shock to dark trading  
will harm market quality in the top tercile group and improve market quality in the bottom tercile 
group. We present mean values of relevant variables for each subsample in Table 8, Panel A. The 
tercile sort produces meaningful separation in dark pool trading. Average DarkTrading_ATS in the 
                                                 
auction trades and trades outside of regular trading session hours). For our sample of 660 stocks, the difference 
between the two averages 0.17% of weekly trading volume and has a standard deviation of 0.34%. 
37 
 
top and bottom tercile groups is 20.5% and 8.9%, respectively, so stocks in the two subsamples 
straddle the tipping point inferred by Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015).  
We estimate a weekly version of the difference-in-difference regression from Equation (6) 
for the top and bottom tercile groups and present the coefficient for the interaction term (TA*Post) 
in Table 8, Panel B. As before, we present the interaction coefficient for DarkTrading in the first 
column to reveal the magnitude of the shock, and now also include results for DarkTrading_ATS 
and DarkTrading_nonATS. Stocks in both the top and bottom terciles experience about a 6% drop 
in DarkTrading_ATS, which should be sufficiently powerful to detect market quality effects. For 
the high DarkTrading_ATS stocks, the signs on each liquidity measure are consistent with market 
quality improvements, but only the coefficient for realized spread is statistically significant. In 
contrast, for the low DarkTrading_ATS group, changes to effective spread, quoted spread, and 
price impact are all positive, and the change is statistically significant for quoted spread and price 
impact. 
Similar shocks to ATS and non-ATS trading within each subsample may contribute to the 
weak statistical significance reported above. In our second tercile split, we attempt to isolate the 
shock to ATS trading. Here, we split according the ratio of DarkTrading_ATS to 
DarkTrading_nonATS. We again present mean values of relevant variables within subsamples in 
Table 8, Panel A. Average DarkTrading_ATS is 19.6% for top tercile stocks and 9.3% for those in 
the bottom tercile. The weekly differences-in-differences analysis that is presented in Panel B 
reveals different shocks to ATS and non-ATS trading for stocks within the top and bottom tercile 
groups. In the top tercile, ATS trading falls by 7.7% while non-ATS trading only falls by 3.6%. In 
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contrast, ATS trading within the bottom tercile drops 5.6% compared to the non-ATS drop of 
7.6%. 
Table 8, Panel B shows, however, that the market quality changes with ATS/non-ATS 
terciles resemble those in the DarkTrading_ATS terciles both in magnitude and statistical 
significance. Thus, even in subsamples that prior literature suggests will contain the strongest 
market quality effects, our tests fail to detect material changes. Our overall conclusion from the 
subsample analyses in Tables 7 and 8 is that while the tick pilot generated massive shocks to 
trading on dark venues, market quality effects are economically and statistically benign. 
Chapter I Conclusion 
Our main message is that a large shift in trading from dark to lit venues around the 2016 
Tick Size Pilot had no meaningful impact on standard measures of market quality. This finding 
should inform policy makers worldwide in the midst of ongoing discussion of the potential benefits 
and dangers of dark trading. The academic literature to date lacks a cohesive empirical voice, no 
doubt due to the endogenous nature of trade routing decisions, as well the fact that dark venues, in 
addition to lacking pre-trade transparency, often utilize a more granular pricing grid than is 
available in lit markets. We circumvent these concerns by exploiting an exogenous shock to dark 
trading that, when compared to the appropriate counterfactual, is distinct from any differences in 
the pricing grid. 
We acknowledge our insignificant results have alternative interpretations. For example, the 
shift in dark trading may result in countervailing and roughly offsetting effects on market quality. 
However, when we analyze changes in other trading characteristics (e.g., turnover, inverted venue 
share of lit trading, and the dispersion of trading across lit venues) that may relate to market quality, 
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we find that such changes, when statistically significant, are economically modest compared to the 
drastic shift in dark trading. Thus, while we cannot rule out a perfectly offsetting effect, we find 
this interpretation less plausible than the simple message that dark trading is mostly benign. 
It is important to note the conclusion that dark trading is largely innocuous to market 
quality does not imply that it is either inconsequential or uninteresting. For the 327 G3 firms over 
the twenty days following the Pilot’s implementation, aggregate dark trading drops by about $4.5 
billion from its level during the twenty days prior to the pilot. From the perspective of dark pool 
operators and exchanges alike, the ultimate destination of these trades and policies that alter this 
flow are quite meaningful as it determines who receives rents from market-making. Moreover, 
since trading algorithms often employ top-level choices of whether to include dark venues, 
frictions that alter the myriad of routing decisions may prove costly by way of implementation. 
Finally, our insignificant results prompt additional analysis at the trader level. None of the 
various metrics we calculate represent sufficient statistics for the welfare of a representative trader. 
Data at the trader level would be useful in this regard as one could construct measures that better 
describe realized investor experience. The work of Jones and Lipson (2001) examining how the 
change from eighths to sixteenths affected institutional trading costs offers a useful template. We 
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Appendix A: Example of Trade-At 
Example 1 
Across all (lit) markets for security ABC, the highest bid price is $20.00 and the lowest 
offer price is $20.10. Exchange1 is displaying a bid to buy 100 shares at $20.00. Exchange2 is 
displaying a bid to buy 100 shares at $19.95. There are no other displayed quotes from buyers. 
Meanwhile, DarkPool1, which as a dark venue does not display quotes, has an order to buy 
800 shares of ABC at $20.00 and an order to sell 800 shares at $20.10. DarkPool1 receives an 
order to sell 100 shares of ABC at the market price. Since dark venues do not display quotes, 
DarkPool1 must either execute the 100 share sell order at $20.05 or route the order to a trading 
that is currently displaying the highest quoted bid price. Given the two orders at DarkPool1, in 
order to execute the 100 share sell order, the dark pool would need to buy 100 shares at $20.05 
and sell 100 shares at $20.00, resulting in a $5.00 loss. As a result, DarkPool1 is unable to fill 100 
shares by partially filling their buy order against the 100 share sell order. If the stock was not 
subject to the Trade-At provision, DarkPool1 could have filled the order rather than execution 
taking place on an exchange venue.  
Under the same conditions, if DarkPool1 received an order to sell 300 shares at the market, 
DarkPool1 could execute 200 shares, after routing 100 shares to Exchange1. This is because, after 
routing an order to sell 100 shares to Exchange1, there are no other bids quoted at $20.00. Once 
DarkPool1 fulfills its Trade-At obligation to route orders to sell as many shares as are currently 
bid at the lowest quoted price, DarkPool1 can execute the remaining shares with their own buy 







Appendix B. Variable Definitions 














DarkTrading Dollar value traded in undisplayed markets (identified in TAQ as execution 
destination equals 'D'), divided by total consolidated dollar value traded. Measure 
is at the stock day level using all trades executed during the regular trading session.
TAQ 
AskDepth Average value of interest quoted at the national best offer price (NBO), during the 
regular trading session, calculated as the daily time-weighted mean per stock. 
TAQ 
BidDepth Average value of interest quoted at the national best bid price (NBB), during the 
regular trading session, calculated as the daily time-weighted mean per stock. 
TAQ 
ES Effective spread. Calculated as the absolute value of twice the difference between 
execution price and the prevailing midpoint (trades exempt from RegNMS rule 611 
are excluded). Dollar-weighted averages are calculated for each stock-day. 
Expressed either in dollars or as a percentage scaled by the prevailing midpoint. 
TAQ 
PI Price impact. Calculated as a buy/sell indicator multiplied by twice the difference 
between execution price and prevailing midpoint five minutes after the trade. 
Dollar-weighted averages are calculated for each stock-day. Expressed either in 
dollars or as a percentage scaled by the prevailing midpoint at the time of execution.
TAQ 
QS Quoted spread. Calculated as the NBO minus NBB, for each consolidated quote 
observed. Time-weighted averages are computed for each-stock day. Expressed 
either in dollars or as a percentage scaled by the prevailing midpoint. 
TAQ 
RS Realized spread. Calculated as a buy/sell indicator multiplied by twice the 
difference between midpoint five minutes after the trade and the prevailing 
midpoint at execution time. Dollar-weighted averages are calculated for each stock-
day. Expressed either in dollars or as a percentage scaled by the prevailing midpoint 







 Variable Description Source 
 
VR Variance ratio. Calculated as absolute value of the daily mean ratio of 
variance of 30 second midpoint returns divided by twice the variance of 15 
second midpoint returns, minus one. 
TAQ 
 
DarkBlocks Measure of day stock level block trades in undisplayed markets, calculated 
as the sum of dollar value of block trades, where block trades are any regular 
session execution valued at greater than the top 1% of trades evaluated over 
the period of April 1st through June 30th 2016. When used as a regressor 
we follow Hatheway, Kwan, & Zheng (2017) and scale by total dollar 
volume traded in dark venues. 
TAQ 
DarkTrading_ATS Calculated as total shares traded across all ATS venues scaled by total share 
volume, measured per stock week. 
FINRA, TAQ 
DarkTrading_nonATS Calculated as total shares traded across dark venues that are not registered 
ATS venues scaled by total share volume, measured per stock week. 
FINRA, TAQ 
InvShare_lit Measure of trading at venues with inverted fees, i.e. liquidity suppliers pay 
a fee on executions and liquidity demanders receive a rebate. Calculated as 
the dollar value traded in inverted markets (during our sample period 
BATS-Y, EDGA, and Nasdaq BX are the only inverted venues in 
operation), divided by total consolidated dollar value traded across all 
displayed trading venues. Measure is at the stock day level using all trades 
executed during the regular trading session. 
TAQ 
InvShare_all Measure of trading at venues with inverted fees, i.e. liquidity suppliers pay 
a fee on executions and liquidity demanders receive a rebate. Calculated as 
the dollar value traded in inverted markets (during our sample period 
BATS-Y, EDGA, and Nasdaq BX are the only inverted venues in 
operation), divided by total consolidated dollar value traded. Measure is at 
the stock day level using all trades executed during the regular trading 
session. 
TAQ 
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  Variable Description Source 
 
MktCap Market capitalization is the product of shares outstanding and daily closing 
price, for pre period evaluations, we use the last market capitalization 




NYSE Dummy variable set to one if a stock is listed on the NYSE as of October 
31, 2016. 
CRSP 
LitVenues Number of lit venues with trades. TAQ 
PIN Measure of ex-ante trading risk from asymmetric information that 
estimates the probability of informed trading (Pin) following Easley, 
Kiefer, & O'Hara (1997). Trades are categorized as buyer or seller initiated 
following Lee & Ready (2001), quotes and trades are matched following 
Holden & Jacobsen (2014), and trades exempt from RegNMS rule 611 are 
excluded. 
TAQ 
TradeSize Dollar value executed scaled by number of trades executed, measured at a 
stock day level. When used as a regressor, we follow Hatheway, Kwan, & 
Zheng (2017) and scale by the average trade size per stock over the pre-
pilot period. 
TAQ 
TradedValue Sum of dollar value executed. When used as a regressor, we take the 
natural log. 
TAQ 
Trades Count of number of executions. TAQ 
Turnover Measures daily trading activity per stock, calculated as the sum of shares 
executed divided by shares outstanding. 
CRSP, TAQ 
UninfSupply Proxied using the share of stock day order imbalances not explained by 
stock day returns. Calculated as the residual from a pooled regression over 
all stock days for a given period, regressing absolute dollar value 





Variable Description Source 
Volatility Proxied using the daily mean per stock of standard deviations of midpoint 
returns using the prevailing quote at each second over the 30 seconds 
following each trade during the regular trading session (excluding trades 
exempt from RegNMS rule 611), following Hatheway, Kwan, & Zheng 
(2017). 
TAQ 
VWAP Volume weighted average prices are calculated using all executions during 
































Figure 1. The effect of Trade-At on dark trading. 
 
This figure plots the mean share of dollar volume executed in dark trading venues for our control 
and treatment stocks. G2 represents our control stocks and G3 represents our treatment group. 
We also plot the difference in variance ratio, between control and treatment groups. The tick size 
pilot was implemented gradually from October 1st until October 31st, which was the first trading 
day in which the pilot is fully enacted. We drop the implementation period from our data but 
present this period by a gray vertical bar. The plot is in calendar time, tracking 20 days up until 
implementation begins, and 20 days subsequent to the pilot being fully implemented. Variables 











































Figure 2. The effect of Trade-At on transaction costs. 
 
This figure plots the mean effective spread of stocks for our control and treatment stocks. G2 
represents our control stocks and G3 represents our treatment group. We also plot the difference 
in variance ratio, between control and treatment groups. The tick size pilot was implemented 
gradually from October 1st until October 31st, which was the first trading day in which the pilot 
is fully enacted. We drop the implementation period from our data but present this period by a 
gray vertical bar. The plot is in calendar time, tracking 20 days up until implementation begins, 
and 20 days subsequent to the pilot being fully implemented. Variables are defined in Appendix 










































Figure 3. The effect of Trade-At on price efficiency. 
 
This figure plots the mean variance ratio of stocks for our control and treatment stocks.  G2 
represents our control stocks and G3 represents our treatment group. We also plot the difference 
in variance ratio, between control and treatment groups. The tick size pilot was implemented 
gradually from October 1st until October 31st, which was the first trading day in which the pilot 
is fully enacted. We drop the implementation period from our data but present this period by a 
gray vertical bar. The plot is in calendar time, tracking 20 days up until implementation begins, 
and 20 days subsequent to the pilot being fully implemented. Variables are defined in Appendix 


















































































Figure 4, continued. 
 
Panel A plots the share of dollar volume executed on inverted venues scaled by total value traded 
(InvShare_all). Panel B plots the share of dollar volume executed on inverted venues scaled by 
all lit executions (InvShare_lit). Panel C plots differences between control and treatment groups 
for: DarkTrading, InvShare_all, and InvShare_lit. G2 represents our control stocks and G3 
represents our treatment group. We also plot the difference between control and treatment 
groups. The pilot was implemented gradually from October 1st until October 31st, the first 
trading day in which the pilot is fully enacted. We drop the implementation period but presented 
this period by a gray vertical bar. The plot is in calendar time, tracking 20 days up until 
implementation begins, and 20 days subsequent to the pilot being fully implemented. Variables 





































Panel C: DarkTrading, InvShare_all, and 
InvShare_lit
(Differences between Treatment and Control






Figure 5. The effect of TradeAt on segments within dark trading. 
Panel A plots the proportion of share volume executed on ATS venues scaled by total shares 
traded (DarkTrading_ATS). Panel B plots the proportion of share volume executed on non-ATS 
dark venues scaled by total shares traded (DarkTrading_nonATS). G2 represents our control 
AAstocks and G3 represents our treatment group. We also plot the difference between control 
and treatment groups. The pilot was implemented gradually from October 1st until October 31st, 
the first trading day in which the pilot is fully enacted. We drop the implementation period but 
present this period by a gray vertical bar. The plot is in calendar time, tracking four weeks up 
until implementation begins, and four weeks subsequent to the pilot being fully implemented. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
MktCap 660 613,526 629,410 121,684 345,767 946,020 
NYSE 660 0.26  0.44  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Trades 660 1,473 1,590 213.575 926.65 2,313 
TradedValue 660 4,716,634 6,613,603 301,926 1,876,548 6,033,475 
Turnover 660 0.0058 0.0051 0.0020 0.0044 0.0076 
VWAP 660 22.10 18.14 8.60 17.02 29.72 
Panel B N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
DarkTrading 660 0.3418 0.1053 0.2648 0.3178 0.4076 
DarkBlocks 660 541,044 835,776 36,106 200,068 679,413 
Fragmentation 660 3.25 0.88 2.64 3.22 3.90 
InvShare_lit 660 0.1176 0.0469 0.0805 0.1282 0.1508 
InvShare_all 660 0.0787 0.0363 0.0477 0.0876 0.1059 
TradeSize 660 2,555 1,722 1,282 2,131 3,249 
Panel C N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
ES (bps) 660 49.90 65.05 9.51 20.53 61.02 
ES ($) 660 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.08 
QS (bps) 660 79.76 100.18 16.80 35.84 96.85 
QS ($) 660 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.14 
PI (bps) 660 19.00 16.70 7.54 12.85 25.27 
RS (bps) 660 29.33 49.31 1.52 5.12 34.84 
VR 660 0.4363 0.0835 0.3815 0.4345 0.4899 
       
       
This table reports summary statistics for the cross-section of stocks from the SEC's tick pilot that 
we study, Pilot groups G2 and G3. The variable MktCap and the NYSE dummy are measured as 
of June 30, 2016. All other variables are first averaged at the stock level over the 20 day period 
before the pilot (September 2nd through the 30th, 2016). Variables are winsorized at 2.5th and 
































This table reports univariate analysis of stock traits over four weeks prior to pilot 
launch, comparing our control group (G2) with the Trade-At treatment group (G3). For 
all variables except MktCap, which is sampled on June 30, 2016, the sample includes 
daily stock-level observations from the 20 day period prior to pilot launch (September 
2nd through the 30th, 2016). Variables are winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, 
and defined in Appendix B. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to 












Table 2. Treatment and Control Differences, Pre-Pilot Period 
 
 
Panel A G2 G3 
G3 - G2  (N = 333) (N = 327) 
  Mean Mean Diff  p-value 
DarkTrading 0.3395 0.3440 0.0045 0.656
MktCap 579,141 648,542 69,402 0.157
TradedValue 4,352,297 5,087,656 735,359 0.141
VWAP 21.55 22.65 1.09 0.319
 
Panel B G2 G3 
G3 - G2  (N = 333) (N = 327) 
  Mean Mean Diff  p-value 
TradeSize 2474 2638 164 0.220
DarkBlocks 476,904 606,361 129,456** 0.047
Fragmentation 3.23 3.27 0.04 0.600
InvShare_lit 0.1153 0.1199 0.0046 0.211
InvShare_all 0.0778 0.0796 0.0018 0.522
 
Panel C G2 G3 
G3 - G2  (N = 333) (N = 327) 
  Mean Mean Diff  p-value 
ES (bps) 54.73 44.98 -9.75* 0.054
QS (bps) 87.29 72.10 -15.18* 0.051
PI (bps) 20.28 17.69 -2.59** 0.046
RS (bps) 32.33 26.26 -6.07 0.114
VR 0.4403 0.4323 -0.01 0.222
AskDepth ($)            6,032             6,280          248 0.396
BidDepth ($)            5,746             6,084          338  0.205
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Table 3. Pre-Pilot Trends 
 
 
 DarkTrading ES QS PI RS VR 
 TA 0.0079 -7.78* -12.41 * -2.71 * -3.77 0.0064 
  (0.0091) (4.60) (7.20) (1.43) (3.58) (0.0122)
 W-3 -0.0306*** 4.19** 4.7 * 3.01 *** 1.07 0.0030 
  (0.0045) (1.65) (2.46) (0.93) (1.68) (0.0119)
 W-2 -0.0065 -3.16* -3.17 1.25 -4.21** (0.0084)
  (0.0052) (1.82) (2.69) (1.10) (1.70) (0.0111)
 W-1 -0.0064 -4.49** -4.03 0.09 -3.76** 0.0636 ***
  (0.0055) (1.86) (2.79) (1.03) (1.77) (0.0128)
 TA * W-3  -0.0080 -1.96 -0.29 -0.3 -2.42 (0.0259)
  (0.0066) (2.24) (3.10) (1.27) (2.28) (0.0167)
 TA * W-2  0.0004 1.87 2.39 -0.37 1.99 (0.0065)
  (0.0072) (2.54) (3.58) (1.40) (2.43) (0.0168)
 TA * W-1  0.0011 2.5 4.16 0.92 0.62 (0.0375)** 
  (0.0076) (2.53) (3.84) (1.36) (2.46) (0.0178)
 Intercept 0.3492 *** 48.79*** 78.22 *** 19.14 *** 28.11*** 0.4276***
  (0.0066) (3.47) (5.41) (1.13) (2.64) (0.01)
 Observations 12,610 12,610 12,610 12,610 12,610 12,610
 R-squared 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005
               
This table reports estimates of Equation (7) by regressing the dependent variables in the top row 
on indicator variables for stocks assigned to the treatment group (TA), week fixed effects for all 
four of the five day periods before the pilot began (W), and interactions between the treatment 
indicator variable and each week fixed effect. The sample includes stock-day observations for 
the 20-day period prior to the Pilot (September 2nd through September 30th, 2016). The weekly 
dummy indicators W-k for k = 1, 2, 3 refer to observations k weeks prior to the Pilot. Variables 
are winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, and defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are 
clustered on firm and date, and appear in parentheses Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, 
and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Impact of Trade-At on Market Quality 
  DarkTrading ES QS PI RS VR ES QS PI RS VR 
Post 0.0363 *** 17.75 *** 25.39 *** 9.21 *** 7.75 *** -0.0068  18.34 *** 27.43 *** 7.94 *** 9.96 *** -0.0101 
 (0.0080) (2.04)  (3.15)  (0.95)  (1.55)  (0.0151)  (1.88)  (3.06)  (0.85)  (1.59)  (0.0148) 
TA 0.0063 -7.2 * -10.87 * -2.66 ** -3.74  -0.0109 ** -3.4 * -4.84  -1.43 * -1.22  -0.0124 ** 
 (0.00) (4.17)  (6.56)  (1.27)  (3.02)  (0.0054)  (2.05)  (3.26)  (0.79)  (1.68)  (0.0053) 
TA * Post -0.1206 *** -0.47  2.97  0.68  -1.66  0.0173 * 0.18  4.02  1.4293  -2.04  0.0160 * 
 (0.00) (2.42)  (3.79)  (1.17)  (1.83)  (0.0094)  (2.14)  (3.43)  (1.07)  (1.66)  (0.0092) 
DarkBlocks             -5.45 ** -11.63 *** -7.65 *** 5.45 ** 0.0252 ** 
             (2.56)  (4.05)  (1.28)  (2.17)  (0.0119) 
Volatility             3.28 *** 4.68 *** 1.77 *** 0.94 *** 0.0001 
             (0.21)  (0.32)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.0001) 
MktCap             -5.52 *** -8.77 *** -6.78 *** 1.08  -0.0101 * 
             (1.88)  (2.91)  (0.85)  (1.32)  (0.0056) 
PIN             182.25 *** 261.67 *** 30.78 *** 132.3 *** -0.0827 ** 
             (19.59)  (31.59)  (7.54)  (16.55)  (0.0417) 
VWAP             -5.26 ** 2.26  -4.43 *** -0.65  0.0011 
             (2.40)  (3.58)  (0.83)  (1.77)  (0.0046) 
TradeSize             5.93 ** 13.16 *** 4.8 *** 1.64  -0.0081 
             (2.50)  (3.87)  (1.20)  (2.14)  (0.0112) 
TradedValue             -10.32 *** -20.44 *** 2.09 *** -12.75 *** 0.0149 *** 
             (1.06)  (1.61)  (0.44)  (0.88)  (0.0028) 
Intercept 0.3383 *** 47.96 *** 77.63 *** 20.23 *** 26.41 *** 0.4419 *** 269.03 *** 459.92 *** 121.73 *** 157.47 *** 0.4449 *** 
 (0.0088) (3.20)  (4.92)  (1.02)  (2.26)  (0.0124)  (30.18)  (46.38)  (12.40)  (23.39)  (0.0834) 
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Table 4, continued. 
 
 DarkTrading ES QS PI RS VR ES QS PI RS VR 
Observation 24,657  
24,65
7 
 24,657  24,657  24,657  24,657  24,657  24,657  24,657  24,657  24,657 
R-squared 0.064   0.02  0.019  0.025  0.006  0.001  0.622  0.646  0.309  0.42  0.007  
                      
 
This table reports estimates of a difference in difference model as in Equation (6). We regress the dependent variables in the top row 
on indicator variables for dates after the pilot is implemented (Post), stocks assigned to the treatment group (TA), and the interaction 
between these indicator variables (TA * Post), which represents the effect of treatment on the treated. Observations span 20 days 
before and after pilot implementation, September 2nd through November 29th, 2016, excluding the staggered implementation from 
October 1st through October 30th. Variables are winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, and defined in Appendix B. Standard 
errors are clustered on firm and date, and appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate 







Table 5.  Impact of the Trade-At Provision 
Panel A DarkTrading Turnover  TradeSize VWAP  
Post 0.0363*** 0.0011*** 257** 1.07*** 
 (0.0080)  (0.0003) (85) (0.20)
   
TA 0.0063  0.0001 158 1.28
 (0.0008)  (0.0004) (134) (1.54)
   
TA * Post -0.1206*** -0.0004* -93*** -0.18
 (0.0045)  (0.0002) (19) (0.32)
   
Intercept 0.3383*** 0.0059*** 2,598*** 22.84*** 
 (0.0088)  (0.0003) (140) (1.06)
   




R-squared 0.064  0.006 0.004 0.001
  
Panel B InvShare_all InvShare_lit Fragmentation LitVenues 
Post 0.0539*** 0.0933*** 0.61*** 0.32*** 
 (0.0027)  (0.0046) (0.09) (0.03)
   
TA  0.0013  0.0042 0.01 0.09
 (0.0027)  (0.0034) (0.06) (0.13)
   
TA * Post 0.0335*** 0.0161*** 0.1** -0.08* 
 (0.0028)  (0.0004) (0.04) (0.04)
   
Intercept 0.0811*** 0.12*** 3.31*** 8.35*** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0042) (0.09) (0.09)
   




R-squared 0.273   0.271  0.070  0.006  
         
This table reports estimates of a difference in difference model as in Equation (6). We regress the 
dependent variables in the top row on indicator variables for dates after the pilot is implemented 
(Post), stocks assigned to the treatment group (TA), and the interaction between these indicator 
variables (TA * Post). Thus the effect of treatment on the treated is the estimated coefficient on 
TA * Post. Observations span 20 days before and after pilot implementation, September 2nd 
through November 29th, 2016, excluding the staggered implementation from October 1st 
through October 30th. Variables are winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, and defined in 
Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered on firm and date, and appear in parentheses. Statistical 




Table 6. OLS and Heckman Correction Estimates - Impact of Dark Trading on 
Transaction Costs 
 




(First Stage) (Second Stage) 
IMR        8.89
   -10.71
DarkTrading 42.29***  44.61*** 
 -6.52  -7.2
DarkBlocks -10.99***  0.89*** -5.79
 -3.26  -0.15 -7.23
Volatility 28,463.94***  -27.85 28,399.42*** 
 -2,907.84  -17.66 -2,934.64
PIN 207.39***  0.75*** 211.82*** 
 -23.16  -0.2 -24.14
VWAP 3.98***  -0.03* 3.27* 
 -1.54  -0.02 -1.78
TradeSize 10.49***  -0.07 10.41*** 
 -3.46  -0.2 -3.6
TradedValue -12.26***  -0.01 -12.53*** 
 -1.03  -0.01 -1.1
MktCap   -0.17***  
   -0.02  
UninfSupply   -1.02***  
   -0.11  
Constant 140.88***  2.94*** 134.03*** 
 -14.06  -0.37 -15.31
Observations 12,610  12,610 12,610
R-squared 0.608   0.418   0.608   
    
This table reports estimates of the relationship between dark trading and transaction costs over 
the 20 day period before the tick size pilot was implemented (September 2nd through September 
30th, 2016). The first column estimates an OLS model.  The second column reports estimates of 
the first-stage of the Heckman correction model, where the dependent variable is the inverse 
normal of DarkTrading. The third column mirrors the OLS specification with the exception of 
including the inverse mills ratio (IMR) estimated in the first-stage Heckman regression 
(correcting for sample selection). Both columns one and three use effective spread as the 
dependent variable. Variables are as defined in Table 1. Variables are winsorized at 2.5th and 
97.5th percentiles, and defined in Appendix B. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and for the 
first and third column are clustered on firm and date. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, 
and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 66
Table 7. Stock Trait Subsamples and the Impact of Dark Trading on Market Quality 
 
  DarkTrading ES QS PI RS VR 
MktCap Top -0.0994*** -1.1573 -0.6563 -0.9088 -0.0486 0.0478** 
(0.0091) (1.0810) (1.4495) (0.6966) (0.4587) (0.0205) 
Bottom -0.1336*** 0.7300 6.9977 3.0064* -3.5031 0.0016 
(0.0066) (3.4930) (5.5717) (1.7744) (2.8483) (0.0111) 
Quoted spread Top -0.1316*** 0.8332 8.7357 5.9359** -7.2993* 0.0207* 
(0.0101) (5.5201) (9.2328) (2.7775) (4.4107) (0.0123) 
Bottom -0.1062*** -1.6286 -0.3404 -1.4400* -0.2136 0.0395*** 
(0.0064) (1.3485) (1.8089) (0.8511) (0.6712) (0.0136) 
Turnover Top -0.1189*** -4.9848* -2.4170 -1.7137 -3.1551* 0.0155 
(0.0064) (3.0213) (4.1575) (1.4180) (1.8569) (0.0158) 
Bottom -0.1244*** 5.2065 9.7073 6.1465** -2.5961 0.0058 
(0.0085) (5.1182) (8.6520) (2.4493) (4.4614) (0.0126) 
Fragmentation Top -0.1226*** -5.3634 -3.0669 -2.0633 -2.7026 0.0115 
(0.0071) (3.3308) (5.0263) (1.6111) (2.2234) (0.0165) 
Bottom -0.1063*** 10.8291** 18.6797** 7.3076*** 0.9797 0.0125 
(0.0079) (4.5878) (7.5374) (2.2793) (3.8550) (0.0118) 
Nickel bind True -0.1309*** -6.4317* -4.6358 -1.8328 -4.3316* 0.0193 
(0.0060) (3.3310) (4.9878) (1.4288) (2.4577) (0.0158) 
False -0.1157*** 2.4699 6.5052 2.7672* -1.7016 0.0151 
(0.0056) (2.6307) (4.4563) (1.4902) (2.1915) (0.0106) 
                
 
This table reports coefficient estimates of the effect of treatment on the treated (TA*Post) based 
on daily difference-in-difference regressions. The time period covers September 2nd through 
November 29th 2016, excluding October. Additional regressors, omitted for brevity, include 
indicator variables for the post period (Post) and selection into the treatment group (TA). In 
regressions using market quality dependent variables control variables are included identical to 
Table 4. The top row contains the dependent variable for each regression. The first column lists 
the stock traits used to split the sample. For each trait there is a row reporting estimates obtained 
in regressions limited to stocks in the Top (Bottom) tercile for that trait. The only exception is the 
row labelled Nickelbind, which divides the sample into stocks with an average quoted spread 
above (below) a nickel, denoted as True (False). Subsamples were formed using cross-sectional 
means calculated over the second quarter of 2016.  Variables are winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th 
percentiles, and defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered on firm and date, and 
appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate 




This table reports mean statistics for heterogeneity within dark trading and coefficient estimates for subsamples based on dark trading 
heterogeneity. Panel A reports  means for the proportion of all trading taking place in all dark venues (DarkTrading), only ATS dark 
venues (DarkTrading_ATS), only non-ATS dark venues (DarkTrading_nonATS), and the ratio of ATS to non-ATS dark trading 
(DarkTrading_ATS / DarkTrading_nonATS). Means are reported for each subsample of stocks, terciles formed on the variable in the 
first column. Panel B reports coefficient estimates for the effect of treatment on the treated (TA*Post) based on difference-in-
difference regressions. Regression of DarkTrading_ATS and DarkTrading_nonATS use stock week observations over the last four 
weeks in September preceding the pilot, and first four weeks after the pilot was fully implemented. All other models use stock day 










Panel A   DarkTrading  DarkTrading_ATS DarkTrading_nonATS 
DarkTrading_ATS / 
DarkTrading_nonATS 
DarkTrading_ATS Top 0.3736 0.2051 0.1665 1.644
Middle 0.3465 0.1534 0.1905 1.058
Bottom 0.4439 0.0894 0.3501 0.429
DarkTrading_ATS / 
DarkTrading_nonATS 
Top 0.3337 0.1956 0.1364 1.802
Middle 0.3538 0.1579 0.1929 0.986












-0.1248 ***  -0.0636 *** -0.0622 *** -4.2931  -1.3049  -0.9865  -4.0182 **  0.0095  
(0.0075)  (0.0073)  (0.0088)  (2.6438)  (4.5140)  (1.2546)  (1.8726)  (0.0119)  
Bottom 
-0.1270 *** 0.0598 *** 0.0611 ***  6.8774  14.3520 *  6.5867 ** -0.5501   0.0112  






-0.1115 *** -0.0769 *** -0.0358 *** -3.1560 * -3.8298  -1.6086 * -2.1250 *  0.0367 *** 
(0.0071)  (0.0079)  (0.0026)  (1.8323)  (2.8299)  (0.9102)  (1.3642)  (0.0105)  
Bottom 
-0.1373 *** -0.0560 ***  0.0760 ***  6.3580  15.7865 *  7.4055 
**
* 
-3.1010   0.0084  
(0.0095)  (0.0062)  (0.0144)  (5.4274)  (8.6087)  (2.6141)  (4.2519)  (0.0124)  
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Table 8, continued. 
  
include indicator variables for the post period (Post) and selection into the treatment group (TA). In regressions using market quality  
dependent variables control variables are included identical to Table 4. The top row contains the dependent variable for each 
regression. The first column lists stock traits used to split the sample. For each trait a row reports estimates obtained in regressions 
limited to stocks in the Top (Bottom) tercile for that trait. Subsamples were formed using cross-sectional means calculated over the  
second quarter of 2016. Variables are winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles defined in Appendix B. Standard errors appear in 
parenthese, clustered on firm and date or week. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 

























































Using newly released data from FINRA, I characterize the locus of trading for all stocks across 
dark and lit trading venues (termed the “liquidity map”). I then investigate whether a stock’s 
“liquidity map” affects its resiliency during extreme market declines. Stocks with more fragmented 
volumes are associated with narrower spreads and lower volatility. The magnitudes of these effects 
are two to three times stronger for fragmentation among dark pool venues compared to lit 
fragmentation. Consistent with a competition story, reductions in transaction costs are driven by 
lower realized spread among more fragmented stocks. Dark pool volumes are also associated with 
more liquidity and less volatility. Conversely, dark volumes traded away from dark pools relate to 
increased volatility. In tests limited to variables available before the FINRA data, I find that earlier 
proxies for dark trading and fragmentation yield incomplete or erroneous inferences. Thus my 
results underscore the benefits of regulatory efforts to make dark trading more transparent. 
 
 
Keywords: Market Fragmentation, Microstructure, Market Efficiency  
JEL codes: G1 
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Introduction to Chapter II 
Investors care most about liquidity when it is scarce, for example when liquidating assets 
in a market downturn. During a market decline, liquidity can suddenly dry up, increasing price 
volatility (Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2008). Depressed asset prices tighten capital constraints on 
intermediaries as the value of their holdings decline, resulting in margin calls, leading to further 
reductions in liquidity supply (Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, & Seasholes 2010). 
When less liquidity is supplied by intermediaries, stocks with more liquidity provided by 
institutional investors fare better during a market shock (Anand, Irvine, Puckett, & Venkataraman 
2013). Meanwhile falling prices induce redemptions of mutual fund shares, and as portfolio 
managers decide which stocks to sell, herding causes incremental reductions to prices and liquidity 
(Dennis & Strickland 2002). The response to market shocks by economic agents is an important 
determinant of how stocks weather a downturn. However, we know comparatively little about how 
market structure impacts the propagation of an aggregate shock in the cross section. 
Dark trading and fragmentation are pervasive facets of modern market structure. In 1993, 
the NYSE executed 79% of shares in listed firms, but only 30% in recent years as trading has 
become increasingly disperse across a fragmented marketplace.26 Conversely, “dark trading” (i.e. 
trades executed away from exchanges) has grown over the same period, now accounting for over 
one third of US equity trading volumes.27 Within dark trading there are currently 46 registered 
Alternative Trading System venues (ATS), commonly referred to as “dark pools”.28 Dark pools 
execute about 15% of trading volumes, but on a given week some stocks transact in as many as 39 
                                                 
26 In my sample period, NYSE market share of NYSE listed firms is 29.78%. Historical estimates come from the 
SEC’s 1994 report, “Market 2000” (https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/market2000.pdf).  
27 In the past two decades it is estimated dark trading volumes rose from 5% to 40% (Angel Harris, & Spatt 2015). 
28 As of February 28th, 2019 (http://www.finra.org/industry/equity-ats-firms). 
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dark pools while other stocks transact in none. Given the cross sectional variation and prevalence 
of dark trading and fragmentation, it is certainly possible that trading heterogeneity impacts how 
stocks weather aggregate market shocks. Dark trading and fragmentation may stabilize markets 
during downturns, by increasing competition between liquidity suppliers within and across trading 
venues. Alternatively, higher search costs in dark markets may cause stocks typically trading 
across a host of dark venues to be worse off during times of market stress. Searching more venues 
delays execution, increasing uncertainty, as more time allows prices to move further from levels 
that induced a decision to trade. My study attempts to test these competing theories to learn about 
the effects of dark trading and fragmentation in the cross section of stocks for extreme down days 
on the market. 
Overall my findings indicate that dark trading and fragmentation can help explain how 
market shocks impact individual securities. I find that on big down days in the aggregate market, 
when market returns are below two standard deviations of the mean, stocks with greater 
fragmentation are more liquid and less volatile. Estimated benefits are two to three times larger for 
fragmentation among dark venues. Moreover, greater execution volumes in dark pools are also 
tied to lower volatility and trading costs. Liquidity improvements are driven by reductions to 
realized spread, consistent with benefits deriving from increased competition. Interestingly, 
performing the same analysis using proxies available to earlier researcher yields different 
inferences, underscoring the importance of accounting for heterogeneity within dark trading. 
This study is the first to my knowledge to examine this research question, and is made 
possible by a public dataset provided by FINRA (a US regulator of broker dealers), which 
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attributes trading volumes to individual dark pools at the stock-venue level.29 Earlier work proxied 
for dark trading and fragmentation using aggregate dark volumes (O’Hara & Ye 2011; Hatheway, 
Kwan, & Zheng 2017) or dispersion among lit venues (Degryse, De Jong, & van Kervel 2015; 
Haslag & Ringgenberg 2016). 30 However, these proxies are indirect and noisy for measuring 
variation within dark trading or fragmentation among dark venues. As a result, prior studies were 
unable to leverage the considerable cross sectional variation in where dark trading occurs (Ready 
2014; Buti, Rindi, & Werner 2017; among others) to explain market quality outcomes. Given a 
more nuanced picture of where stocks trade, we can better understand how market structure affects 
market efficiency. 
Where a stock trades could influence market quality, because market mechanisms and 
counterparties vary greatly among dark trading venues (Tuttle 2013; Tuttle 2014; Farley, Kelley, 
& Puckett 2019). Given the heterogeneity in dark venues and cross sectional variation in where 
stocks trade, if the location of trading is persistent, it is feasible for past information mapping out 
trading volumes to explain how stocks fare during aggregate market shocks. I confirm there is 
considerable persistence in variables describing where stocks are traded.31 
To examine the effects of dark trading and fragmentation under a negative market shock, I 
construct a “liquidity map” for each stock in my sample by calculating variables that describe 
proportional volumes over different market segments, and dispersion within them. For 
proportional measures, I calculate market shares of trading volumes in a given segment of the dark 
                                                 
29 FINRA began providing this and other data on dark trading as of May 12, 2014 (http://www.finra.org/industry/otc-
%28ats-%26-non-ats%29-transparency).   
30 Dark volumes are coded with exchange “D” in public trade data feeds, but without attribution to any specific dark 
venue. Conversely, lit venues report trades to the same feed using their unique exchange code.  
31 In autoregressive analysis of sample stocks, the average AR1 coefficients for variables describing where a stock 
trades range from 0.94 to 0.96.  
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market scaled by total executed shares. Specifically, I use dark trading venue attribution data from 
FINRA to separate dark trading into dark pool volumes and what I term “elevator” volumes 
(comprised of upstairs trading and internalization). Additionally, I calculate an inverse Herfindahl-
based measure to quantify fragmentation overall, among exchange venues (“lit fragmentation”), 
and dark pools (“dark fragmentation”).32 In the spirit of Dennis & Strickland (2002) and Hameed, 
Kang, & Viswanathan (2010), I identify event days of extreme market decline when returns to the 
CRSP value-weighted index are more than two standard deviations below the sample period 
mean.33 For each event, I construct a pre-event window from five weeks up until one week prior 
to the event. Liquidity map variables and controls for stock characteristics are measured over the 
pre-event window, and used to explain liquidity, volatility, and returns on event days. I also 
analyze returns over periods subsequent to event days. Within this setting, using lagged regressors 
mitigates the concern of simultaneity bias to infer causal relationships between a stock’s liquidity 
map and its resilience in facing a market decline. 
My primary empirical tests regress market quality measures on a stock’s liquidity map. I 
find evidence of benefits associated with dark trading and fragmentation. Additionally, by 
comparing results using variables from before the FINRA data was available with FINRA’s more 
granular data, I find that aggregated dark trading volumes provide an incomplete picture. When 
using the share of aggregate dark volumes, available to earlier work, I find dark trading increases 
spreads and volatility. However, by isolating volumes to dark pool executions, I draw the opposite 
inference. I estimate a one standard deviation increase in dark pool volumes reduces effective 
                                                 
32 This fragmentation measure, based on dispersion of trading volumes, follows: Bennett & Wei (2006); Nguyen, Van 
Ness, & Van Ness (2007); Degryse, De Jong, & van Kervel (2015); and others. 
33 Results are qualitatively similar when considering alternative definitions of extreme market declines, such as 
declines to: the CRSP equal-weighted index, overnight returns to SPY, and intraday returns of sample stocks. 
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spread during a market decline by 1.58 to 1.85 basis points (bps) and is related to lower volatility. 
Conversely, dark trading outside of dark pools (e.g. high frequency trading internalization and 
bilateral negotiations) is positively related to illiquidity costs and volatility. These findings suggest 
it is necessary to examine individual aspects of the dark market in order to avoid potentially 
deleterious policy prescriptions. Consistent with this proposition, in addition to looking at the size 
of segments of the dark market I also study dispersion within them. 
More fragmented stocks are more liquid and less volatile during times of market stress. 
However, using fragmentation measures available before the FINRA data underestimates the 
benefits. In regressions of market quality measures on both lit and dark fragmentation, the effects 
of dark fragmentation are estimated to be two to three times the magnitude of lit fragmentation. 
For example, a one standard deviation increase to dark (lit) fragmentation corresponds to a 2.54 
(1.05) bps reduction to effective spread. Reductions in effective spread are driven by declines in 
realized spread, consistent with competition reducing profits from liquidity provision.  
In analysis on price dislocations, I find evidence that more fragmented stocks experience 
larger price declines on days the aggregate market experiences a large decline. In subsequent 
analysis, I find limited evidence this price response is consistent with investor overreaction in 
smaller firms. Overall my findings provide strong evidence that market structure matters for how 
a stock weathers a market decline and the return process that follows. 
A considerable number of studies examine implications of the heterogeneity documented 
among liquidity providers (Acharya & Viswanathan 2011), but this paper is the first to my 
knowledge to study effects of heterogeneity within dark trading and fragmentation during periods 
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of market stress.34 Given the reduced fees and enhanced rebates provided by exchanges to 
obligatory market makers, when they scale down liquidity provision during a market decline 
(Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, & Seasholes 2010), there is a more even playing 
field to supply liquidity (Clark-Joseph, Ye, & Zi 2017). Increased urgency among investors and 
reduced participation by obligatory market makers, offers revenue opportunities for voluntary 
liquidity providers (Anand, Irvine, Puckett, & Venkataraman 2013). I view my results as 
complementary to this story. I find that stocks with higher dark pools volumes and stocks with 
more fragmented trading offer greater liquidity and less volatility in times of stress. Conversely, 
while higher search costs might be expected from dark trading due to reduced execution 
probability (Zhu 2014), I do not find evidence of search frictions reducing liquidity or increasing 
volatility during market declines (Duffie, Garleanu, & Pedersen 2007). My contribution hinges on 
new data about dark trading volumes, made available in an effort by regulators to increase the 
transparency of dark trading. Thus, my findings illustrate how this initiative provides a valuable 
opportunity to improve our understanding of how market structure impacts investment outcomes.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses background 
information on current market structure. Section 3 explains the details of my sample and measures. 
Section 4 discusses my empirical analysis. Section 5 presents robustness tests, and Section 6 
concludes.  
Market Structure 
The defining characteristic of dark trading is that, whereas traders can observe the prices 
and sizes available to trade against in exchanges (“lit venues”), trading interest is completely 
                                                 
34 A contemporaneous working paper, Felez-Vinas (2018), offers complementary results, finding lit fragmentation 
improves quoted spread and depth within the context of adverse market conditions. Dark trading is outside the scope 
of her study which is focused on impacts to the consolidated order book from additional quoting venues.  
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unobservable in dark venues. Dark trading is comprised of two segments. ATSs (also known as 
“dark pools”) and the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Dark pools execute trades by matching 
compatible orders within their undisclosed electronic limit order book. Regulators require that a 
firm be a broker-dealer to operate a dark pool, however some operators register as such without 
conducting other business typical to brokers (e.g. trading on behalf of clients). Most dark pools 
match orders electronically based on price-size-time priority, while lit venues prioritize orders by 
price-time-size. Though originally marketed to institutional investors interested in trading large 
orders with other institutions, in recent years average trade sizes have decreased in dark pools 
while potential counterparties broadened to include broker-dealers, retail investors, and high 
frequency trading firms (HFT).35  While dark pools receive the lion’s share of press coverage, the 
majority of dark trading takes place in the OTC market.  Historically, the term “OTC” has been 
used to describe unlisted stocks, Nasdaq-listed stocks, trading off-exchange, trading off-exchange 
but not in a dark pool, and upstairs market trading.36 To avoid this confusion, I instead adopt the 
term “elevator” for trades occurring away from lit and dark pool venues. Thus, elevator describes 
a combination of trading via manual human interaction in upstairs markets and automated 
“internalizing” by HFTs. 
The more modern segment of the elevator market encompasses internalizer venues 
operated by HFTs. Internalizers use high speed, sophisticated short horizon trading algorithms to 
consider whether or not to expend capital to execute against each new order as it arrives. The 
economics involved mirror the capital commitment transactions of traditional market makers. 
However, the decision whether to commit capital leverages a comprehensive view of firm 
                                                 
35 Dark pools can limit access to their venue and discuss counterparty “quality” in marketing materials. For example, 
Luminex (https://luminextrading.com/how-it-works/) 
36 FINRAs view on the term OTC: https://www.finra.org/investors/unraveling-mystery-over-counter-trading  
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inventory and market conditions across asset classes. A significant share of executions on 
internalizer venues come from payment-for-order-flow arrangements with large retail brokerages, 
and most retail executions are against HFT internalizers (Comerton-Forde, Malinova & Park 2018 
and others). The remainder of elevator trading occurs in the upstairs market with very different 
mechanisms and counterparties.  
In the upstairs market, trading is accomplished via bilateral bargaining. Brokers either 
“shop” client orders to find offsetting trading interest among other institutional customers, or 
provide liquidity from their own inventory. The defining trait of the upstairs market is transacting 
via communication between humans away from any exchange. While trading in upstairs markets 
is quite different from internalizer venues, distinguishing between these types of trades is limited 
with available data.  
Dark trades are reported to the public through an intermediary called a trade reporting 
facilities (TRF). In terms of post trade transparency, while all trades are reported in real time, only 
executions in lit venues disclose the specific venue where a transaction takes place. Historically, 
the operators of these TRFs, NYSE and Nasdaq, did not distinguish between off-exchange trades 
and executions from their own order books. This meant researchers were completely unable to 
observe dark trading. In 2008, regulators began requiring TRFs to report dark trades using the 
destination code “D” to distinguish dark trades from other transactions. This level of granularity 
facilitated initial research in the area (O’Hara & Ye 2011). However, since researchers had no 
ability to observe venue allocations within dark trading, researchers treated it as a homogenous 
market segment. In 2014, FINRA undertook an initiative to increase the transparency of dark 
trading. This initiative resulted in the first highly granular, publicly available dataset that details 




My sample begins with the universe of NYSE and Nasdaq listed CRSP common stocks 
(share codes 10 and 11) with available data on event days. Event days are defined as any trading 
day where there is a negative two sigma move in the aggregate market.37 I proxy for the aggregate 
market using the CRSP value-weighted index, which has a mean return of 0.028% over my sample 
period. Based on this event criteria, there are 43 event days where the CRSP value-weighted index 
declines by more than my cutoff (-1.630%). I exclude stocks with a volume-weighted average 
price (VWAP) below $3.00 or above $999.00 over a four week pre-event period prior to a given 
event day. Stocks that have traded less than 10 days during a pre-event period are also excluded. 
All analysis relies on TAQ data to calculate liquidity measures and variables describing a stock’s 
trading environment over the pre-event period. Thus, stocks without sufficient TAQ data for 
relevant time periods are also dropped. The data required to attribute dark trading volumes to 
specific market segments and trading venues became available from FINRA as of May 12th, 2014. 
My main regression model requires lagged data as far back as five weeks prior to a given event 
date. As a result, my sample period covers June 16th, 2014 to December 31st, 2018. The resulting 
sample is an unbalanced panel covering 3,398,449 stock- days, comprised of 4,129 unique firms. 
Definitions for all variables are available in Appendix A.   
My main data comes from a transparency initiative undertaken by the US Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The data became available as of May 12th, 2014 
motivated by concerns that dark trading was too opaque and potentially harmful. FINRA provides 
the number of trades and shares executed per stock-week for every US dark pool. FINRA also 
                                                 
37 This is slightly more conservative than Hameed, Kang, & Viswanathan (2010) who use 1.5 standard deviations as 
their cutoff criteria for significant market down days. 
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provides “elevator” market volumes, but it is not possible to distinguish between HFT internalizers 
from the upstairs market. This is because often the largest share of elevator volumes come from 
venues that execute less than 200 trades in a given stock-week. FINRA aggregates these trades 
and categorizes them as “de minimis” without attributing specific trading venues. Despite this 
limitation, venue level dark pool volumes provide considerable insight. 
 Figure 6 (Appendix B) demonstrates the granularity of the FINRA data compared to data 
available to earlier work. Panel A presents proportional volumes per market segment for four 
stocks during for the week of June 16th, 2014. NYSE’s Trade & Quote data (TAQ) facilitates 
calculating venue level volumes, but only for lit venues. While all dark trades are included in TAQ 
and disseminated publicly in real time, they are labelled as dark without disclosing a specific 
venue. The purple portions of the pie charts analogously represents aggregate dark volumes. 
Before the FINRA data was available, all that could observed in TAQ was the difference between 
lit (yellow) and dark (purple) volumes. With the data from FINRA, heterogeneity within dark 
trading is now observable. In bar charts corresponding to a given pie chart, I use the FINRA data 
to disaggregate dark trading into dark pool and elevator volumes, blue and red respectively. For 
example, 33% and 20% of volumes for HSP and MKL respectively traded in the dark with two 
thirds executed in dark pools and the remaining third in elevator venues. Before the FINRA data 
there was no way to differentiate between the portions of dark trading taking place in dark pools 
versus elevator venues.  
In Panel B, I present venue level market shares within dark pool volumes, none of which 
is observable via TAQ. Here we see HSP had notably higher volumes in half a dozen or so of the 
33 dark pools where it traded, with at most 2.22% of total volumes from any one venue. 
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Meanwhile, MKL had 40% of dark pool volumes from only one of the 25 dark pools where it 
traded. Before the FINRA data was available none of this nuance was observable.  
To measure a stock’s liquidity map I calculate variables describing proportional market 
shares of different market segments and dispersion within them. Aggregate dark trading volumes 
come from TAQ which I scale by total volumes to measure aggregate dark trading (DarkTrd). I 
decompose dark volumes between dark pools (DarkPool) and elevator markets (Elev) by summing 
volumes from FINRA, by total volumes in TAQ.38 Dispersion measures use an HHI-based method: 
     = 	 1 ∑(
       
∑(       )
)         (1) 
Thus, FRAG is the inverse of the sum of squared market shares within a given market 
segment, such that the lower bound is one (for completely consolidated trading), and the upper 
bound is the number of venues that exist (implying perfectly uniform volumes).39 I calculate this 
measure over all lit and dark pool venues (Frag), only lit venues (FragLit), and only dark pool 
venues (FragDark). FINRA data reports at the stock-week level, while TAQ reports at the stock-
day level. Therefore, merging this data requires aggregating daily TAQ data at the weekly level. 
Thus all liquidity map variables are constructed at the stock-week level (e.g. FragLit uses lit venue 
market shares for a given week calculated using daily TAQ data).40  
Panel A of Table 9 provides summary statistics for liquidity map variables, grouped by 
NYSE market capitalization quintile. The first three columns detail proportional measures, 
                                                 
38 Elevator data is only available from FINRA starting April 6th, 2016. In earlier periods I infer this variable by 
subtracting dark pool volumes from aggregate dark trading.  
39 Rather than subtracting the HHI concentration by one as in Degryse, De Jong, & van Kervel (2015) and Haslag & 
Ringgenberg (2016), by dividing one by HHI concentration (following Fidessa 2006) I allow lit and dark 
fragmentation to take on different ranges, reflecting the existence of many more dark pools than exchanges.  
40 There are some stock-weeks where reconciling volume statistics between TAQ and FINRA appear erroneous. I 
filter out stock-weeks where dark pool or elevator volumes exceed off-exchange volumes reported by TAQ (1% of 
observations). I also filter out stock-weeks where the sum of dark pool and elevator volumes exceed aggregated dark 
volumes reported by TAQ if the difference is at least five percent of total traded shares (2% of observations). 
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followed by   three measures of fragmentation. While DarkTrd can be calculated using only TAQ 
data, DarkPool and Elev are only observable using the FINRA data. Similarly, out of my 
fragmentation measures, only FragLit could be observed using TAQ data while Frag and 
FragDark require data from FINRA. By looking at how these liquidity map variables relate to firm 
size, it is apparent that the FINRA data reveals considerable nuance not available using TAQ data 
alone. 
Consistent with previous findings, Table 9 shows that in my sample dark trading accounts 
for 36.26% of volumes, with 14.97% from dark pools and 23.22% from elevator markets.41 Using 
TAQ data, it was already possible to observe that aggregate dark volumes decrease as size 
increases. However using the FINRA data, we learn the relationship between dark pool shares and 
size appears non-linear while elevator volumes have an inverse relationship with size (similar to 
aggregate dark trading). For the smallest stocks, two thirds of dark trading takes place in elevator 
markets. For larger stocks, the split between dark pools and elevator venues is much more even. 
Meanwhile, the positive relation between FragLit and size was observable using only TAQ data, 
though with the FINRA data, we learn there is much more variation in FragDark between size 
quintiles. Beyond motivation to control for size in regression analysis, these statistics offer 
evidence of systematic differences between these variables.  
Dependent variables are constructed to measure market quality. Liquidity and volatility 
measures use TAQ and daily returns come from CRSP. My main measure of liquidity is effective 
spread. If the midpoint is a “fair price”, then effective spread measures a trader’s willingness to 
pay for immediacy, calculated as:  
                                                 
41 For example, Menkveld et al. (2017) reports that of the third of volumes executed in dark venues, dark pools account 
for about 15% of total volumes.  
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ES = 2 ∗
   (                )
         
           (2) 
I also decompose effective spread into price impact (PI) and realized spread (RS), typical 
proxies for liquidity costs related to adverse selection and profits to liquidity suppliers, 
respectively:  
PI =         ∗ 2 ∗
            	         
         
                 (3) 
RS =         ∗ 2 ∗
                  
         
                     (4) 
In the above equations, price is the price of an execution, midpoint is the average of the 
NBO and NBB, t is the time a trade occurred, and BuySell equals 1 (-1) if the trade is buyer (seller) 
initiated following the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. Specifically, I follow Holden and 
Jacobsen (2014) using one microsecond lags for matching quotes and trades, and incorporating 
TAQs quote file with their NBBO file. I use 30 second lags to compute PI and RS. Therefore, my 
liquidity variables capture dollar-weighted stock-day averages for effective spread, price impact, 
and realized spread. I measure stock-day volatility as the standard deviation of returns over all 
executions in a regular trading session. Abnormal returns use DGTW benchmarks, relying on 
CompuStat data to form book-to-market portfolios. 
In Panel B of Table 9, I present traits and market quality measures of sample stocks. The 
mean stock has a market capitalization of nearly $6B, with a standard deviation of $25B. In this 
broad group of firms, 37% are listed on NYSE, with the average stock trading over 7,000 times a 
day, executing over $53B in volumes. The median effective spread is 17.96 bps or $0.036, 
compared to quoted spreads of 32.23 bps or $0.064. Similar to statistics concerning size, liquidity 
measures exhibit large standard deviations and positive skew. Volatility is also positively skewed, 
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with mean and medians of 0.30% and 0.11% respectively. Looking at the cross section over the 
entire sample period provides a reference point for trading conditions on event days. 
 Table 10 presents descriptive statistics on event dates, i.e. days when the market 
experiences a negative two-sigma event. Statistics pertaining to all event dates are presented in 
Panel A. Panel B presents mean values aggregated by year. The value-weighted market return on 
event days is -1.93%, slightly smaller than the -2% criteria for extreme market declines in Dennis 
& Strickland (2002). Compared to liquidity measures over the entire sample period in Table 9, 
median effective and quoted spread are nearly doubled on event days, as is volatility. Additionally, 
in Table 9 market quality variables exhibit significant positive skewness, but on event days the 
distribution appears much more symmetrical. Trading costs and volatility are lower in the third 
quartiles on event days compared to typical days from Table 9. However, compared to Table 9, 
the first quartile of spreads and volatility is much higher on event days. Panel B indicates spreads, 
volatility and returns look fairly consistent for event days falling in different years. Also, there is 
evidence of event clustering, with 10 (20) event dates in 2016 (2018).  
Since FINRA’s dark trading data facilitates novel measures of a stock’s liquidity map 
(where it trades), it is worth considering how these variables relate to earlier proxies and other 
aspects of the trading environment. Table 11 presents correlation coefficients across liquidity map, 
market quality, and stock trait variables. Earlier work proxied for dark trading and fragmentation 
with the proportion of aggregate dark trading (DarkTrd). However, correlations are weak and 
negative between DarkTrd and fragmentation measures with estimates of -0.22, -0.01, and -0.22 
for Frag, FragLit, and FragDark respectively. Another proxy used in prior work is FragLit. This 
proxy is highly correlated with Frag and FragDark, with coefficients of 0.76 and 0.45. The strong 
correlation between FragLit and Frag is to be expected, since the lit market shares used to calculate 
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FragLit are included in the calculation of Frag. There is also strong correlation between 
fragmentation measures and dark pool trading. However, the correlation between aggregate dark 
trading (DarkTrd) and dark pool volumes (DarkPool) is only 0.10. There is a much stronger 
correlation of 0.69 between DarkTrd and Elev, indicating that studies proxying for dark trading 
using aggregate measures like DarkTrd may be drawing inferences about the effects of elevator 
markets rather than dark pools. Additionally, Elev is negatively correlated to all fragmentation 
measures. In terms of market quality, it is notable that spreads and volatility are negatively 
correlated with DarkPool and fragmentation, but positively correlated with DarkTrd and Elev. 
This correlation matrix provides additional support to believe more granular measures of dark 
trading and fragmentation could yield incremental understanding of their effects, motivating a 
more rigorous regression based framework.  
Analysis & Results 
My empirical strategy uses lagged measures of a stock’s liquidity map and control variables to 
explain: liquidity, volatility, and abnormal returns on days of extreme market decline: 
  ,  = 	          ,    ∗      	+ 	         ,    +	        	+ 	   ,    	 +	    	+ 	  ,         (5) 
Where Y is the dependent variable for stock i at time t, LiqMap is a vector of variables describing 
where a stock traded over the pre-event period, Evt is an indicator variable equal to one on event 
dates and zero otherwise, Z is a vector of control variables measured over the pre-event period,   
is stock fixed effects, and   is the residual. Similar to Hameed, Kang, & Viswanathan (2010), my 
panel includes all dates in the sample period and my variables of interest are interaction terms 
between Evt and liquidity map variables. These interaction terms capture the incremental effects 
of a given liquidity map variable, conditional on a negative two-sigma event. Therefore, 
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coefficients on standalone liquidity map variables estimate the unconditional relationship between 
the dependent variable and a given dimension of the liquidity map. For ease of interpretation, all 
liquidity map variables are standardized with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Thus, 
coefficient estimates describe the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in a given 
variable of interest. For example, DarkTrd coefficients estimate the unconditional relationship 
with the dependent variable, while DarkTrd X Evt captures the incremental effects of DarkTrd 
conditional on extreme market decline.  
My vector of control variables is typical to the literature. Mktcap proxies for firm size, 
Price is calculated as the volume-weighted average price (VWAP), TrdSz is the average value of 
trades, Turnover is shares traded scaled by shares outstanding, and all except Mktcap are pre-
period means. Additionally, I include contemporaneous returns to the CRSP value-weighted index 
(CRSP) to account for variations in the magnitude of market declines (results are quantitatively 
consistent without inclusion). Finally, all standard errors reported are clustered on firm and date. 
To construct the pre-period window, I begin at the start of the trading week five weeks 
prior to each date in the sample period. Then I calculate the mean of each variable over the 
subsequent four trading weeks and ignore the week immediately preceding a given date.42 The 
resulting unbalanced panel dataset includes stock-day level dependent variables on a given date 
with mean values of explanatory variables calculated using data from the previous fifth through 
second weeks, but not the closest prior week. 
Liquidity 
In Table 12, I present estimates on the effects of a stock’s liquidity map on effective spread. 
First, let us consider the results using proportional measures available before the FINRA data. In 
                                                 
42 Except for market capitalization which is measured on the first day of the pre-period. 
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column one we see the unconditional relation between spreads and DarkTrd, aggregate dark 
volumes, is negative and economically small (0.53 bps). This is consistent with the findings of 
O’Hara & Ye (2011). However, the interaction term (DarkTrd X Evt) is positive and significant, 
indicating a one standard deviation increase in aggregate dark trading increases effective spread 
by 1.82 bps on large down days. Using the data from FINRA, in columns two and three, I 
decompose dark trading into its two market segments (DarkPool and Elev) and find very different 
results. DarkPool is positive and insignificant in an unconditional context, but the interaction term 
DarkPool X Evt indicates that conditional on an extreme market decline, a one standard deviation 
increase in dark pool volumes reduces effective spread by 1.85 bps. Column three shows a negative 
insignificant estimate on Elev and a positive and significant coefficient for the variable of interest, 
Elev X Evt, of 6.08 (t-stat of 2.08). In column four, I include both DarkPool, Elev, and their 
corresponding interaction terms. The coefficients decrease in magnitude but directional estimates 
are consistent with beta estimates of -1.58 for DarkPool X Evt (t-stat of -4.89) and 4.20 for Elev X 
Evt (t-stat of 1.82) respectively. These results on effective spread indicate that heterogeneity within 
dark trading has differential effects on liquidity and that using DarkTrd as a proxy could provide 
erroneous inference. Using only TAQ data, these results would be limited to inferences regarding 
DarkTrd, and the improvements to liquidity associated with DarkPool would be unobservable. 
 Columns five through eight examine the effects of fragmentation. All three measures of 
fragmentation have a negative significant relation to effective spread, both unconditionally and in 
the context of market declines. When lit fragmentation is alone, in column six, the variable of 
interest is estimated to indicate a -2.46 bps (t-stat of -5.87) reduction to effective spread.  The 
comparable estimate for dark fragmentation in column seven is -3.43 (t-stat of -5.53). When lit 
and dark fragmentation are included together, the estimated beta on FragLit X Evt drops to a range 
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of -1.05 (t-stat of -4.24) to -1.14 (t-stat of -4.61), and FragDark X Evt ranges from -2.54 (t-stat of 
-4.98) to -2.83 (t-stat of -5.15).43 This analysis consistently indicates that fragmentation reduces 
trading costs during a large market decline. Moreover, the benefits of fragmentation depend on the 
types of venues considered, as the magnitude of coefficients on FragDark X Evt is more than twice 
that of FragLit X Evt. Thus, it appears without the FINRA data, using lit fragmentation to proxy 
for overall or dark pool fragmentation would underestimate the benefits. Finally, in column nine I 
include lit and dark fragmentation alongside DarkPool and Elev volume measures. Interaction 
terms for DarkPool and Elev lose statistical significance while lit and dark fragmentation remain 
significant with coefficient estimates falling only slightly to -1.05 and -2.54 bps respectively.44 
The negative, significant relationship on large down days between effective spread and dark 
fragmentation is stable throughout Table 12. Additionally, the beta estimate on FragDark X Evt (-
2.54) is economically significant, representing a 6.10% (15.76%) reduction in transaction costs 
from the sample mean (median) of 46.39 bps (17.96 bps). Overall dark pool volumes and 
dispersion among them seem to improve liquidity during a market drop, and there is some evidence 
that elevator trading increases effective spread.45 Conversely, before the FINRA data my results 
would indicate that dark trading harms liquidity and lit fragmentation is beneficial. 
To search for a feasible mechanism by which dark trading and fragmentation affects 
liquidity I decompose effective spread into price impact (a proxy for adverse selection costs) and 
realized spread (a proxy for profits to liquidity providers). Table 13 presents these results for price 
                                                 
43 When combining FragLit and FragDark in the same model, estimates on standalone terms stay largely the same 
(betas of 0.10 and -2.40, and t-stats of 0.69 and -15.66), with a slight reduction to the marginal effects of FragLit. 
44 In an unconditional setting, the estimated coefficient on DarkPool becomes 0.07 (t-stat of 0.58), Elev becomes -
0.61 (t-stat of -0.001), and coefficients on FragLit and FragDark increase slightly to 0.08 and -2.42 (with t-stats of 
0.50 and -16.44). 
45 Notional versus relative calculations of effective and quoted spread yields qualitatively similar results. 
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impact and Table 14 for realized spread. For price impact, estimated relations largely mirror the 
results in Table 12. However, t-stats are softened for interaction terms on DarkPool and Elev, and 
all beta coefficients drop in magnitude. For example, beta estimates on the variable of interest for 
DarkPool range from -0.33 (t-stat of -2.70) to -0.39 (t-stat of -2.83), but fall to -0.03 (t-stat of -
0.26) when alongside fragmentation variables. Meanwhile for Elev, coefficients on the variable of 
interest range from 0.91 (t-stat of 1.50) to 1.37 (t-stat of 1.75) without fragmentation variables, 
and 1.31 (t-stat of 1.86) in column nine. In terms of fragmentation, variables of interest indicate 
significant negative relationships with price impact. When it is the only variable of interest, the 
coefficient estimate of FragLit X Evt is -0.548 (t-stat of -3.54), but falls to -0.268 (t-stat of -2.37) 
once FragDark is added to the model. The estimate on FragDark X Evt is -0.73 (t-stat of -3.42) 
when alone, and ranges from -0.52 (t-stat of -2.84) to -0.60 (t-stat of -3.14) in specifications that 
include FragLit.   
For realized spread, directional inferences mirror Table 12 and beta estimates are much 
larger in magnitude compared to Table 13. Estimates on the variable of interest for dark 
fragmentation are stable over all specifications, with a beta of -2.37 (t-stat of -5.22) when alone, 
and a range of -1.81 (t-stat of -4.73) to 1.96 (t-stat of -4.67) when alongside lit fragmentation. 
Interaction terms for lit fragmentation are negative and statistically significant throughout, but 
smaller in magnitude than dark fragmentation. The interaction term on DarkPool indicates lower 
realized spread, but estimates are no longer statistically significant when alongside fragmentation 
variables. Meanwhile models that include Elev, show statistically insignificant coefficients on the 
variable of interest, except for column three (significant only at the 10% level). The directional 
relationships estimated in Table 14 agree with those estimated in Table 13, implying dark trading 
and fragmentation have complimentary effects on price impact and realized spread. Additionally, 
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all the interaction terms in Table 14 are larger in magnitude compared to Table 13. The notably 
stronger estimates for realized spread versus price impact are consistent with improved trading 
conditions via increased competition. Conversely without the FINRA data, estimates on DarkTrd 
would imply dark trading reduces liquidity due to increased rent extraction by liquidity providers.  
In addition to analysis using effective spread to proxy for illiquidity costs, I estimate the 
same models with quoted spread as the dependent variable and get similar results. In untabulated 
results on quoted spread, DarkTrd is linked to a significant 2.90 bps increase during market 
declines, but with regressions using DarkPool and Elev the former is negative and significant and 
the latter is positive and insignificant. In untabulated regressions of quoted spread, once both lit 
and dark fragmentation are included, lit fragmentation becomes insignificant but dark 
fragmentation is linked to a significant reduction in spreads of 5.07 to 5.37 bps.  
Volatility 
In addition to liquidity, volatility is a major concern for investors during turbulent markets. 
Table 15 presents results from regressions with volatility as the dependent variable. Column one 
shows what conclusions were available before the FINRA data. The variable of interest, DarkTrd 
X Evt has a coefficient estimate of 1.03 (t-stat of 3.15).46 However, when DarkTrd is decomposed 
into DarkPool and Elev using the FINRA data, only DarkPool is statistically significant with 
coefficient estimates indicating DarkPool (Elev) reduces (exacerbates) volatility. The DarkPool 
interaction term has beta estimates ranging from -0.96 to -1.21, all significant .47 Meanwhile, 
estimates for the interaction on Elev are statistically insignificant ranging from 3.94 to 5.98. Within 
                                                 
46 The unconditional relationship between DarkTrd and volatility is estimated to be 0.75 (t-stat of 4.85). 
47 Beta estimates on the standalone term DarkPool range from -0.43 to -0.49 and are statistically significant. 
Meanwhile, estimates for the unconditional relationship between volatility and Elev are marginally significant and 
range from 2.56 to 2.82 
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my setting of high volatility episodes, stocks with higher dark pool volumes have relatively lower 
volatility. 
In columns five through eight, results consistently indicate fragmentation reduces volatility 
unconditionally and incrementally given a market decline. The magnitude of FragDark X Evt is 
consistent and ranges from -2.09 to -2.26, while the interaction term on FragLit drops from -1.95 
to -0.93 once lit and dark fragmentation are both included in the model. Once both proportional 
and dispersion measures of the liquidity map are included together, estimated effects from 
fragmentation sustain but estimates for DarkPool and Elev terms change. Interaction terms on 
DarkPool are no longer significant and flip positive, while the Elev interaction increases to 4.92 
and becomes significant at the 5% level.48 While some volatility results using proportional 
measures are tenuous, it is worth noting using DarkTrd alone would yield contrary inference. 
Moreover, while FragLit was available to earlier work before the FINRA data and estimates 
indicate it reduces volatility similar to FragDark, these results offer different policy prescriptions. 
For example, finding benefits from FragLit without being able to assess FragDark would not 
assuage concerns that proliferation of dark pools is detrimental to market quality. Additionally, 
leveraging the FINRA data indicates that benefits from dark fragmentation are stronger than those 
from lit fragmentation. In summary, during market turbulence when volatility is high across the 
asset class, highly fragmented stocks exhibit less volatile prices. 
Price Effects 
To examine how a stock’s liquidity map affects price dislocation I regress DGTW 
abnormal returns on the same model, presented in Table 16. In analysis limited to variables 
                                                 
48 Unconditional estimates for DarkPool and Elev are both positive and significant at the 1% level. 
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available in TAQ, the interaction term on aggregate dark trading has an estimated effect of 
increasing abnormal returns by 10 bps. However using the FINRA data, I estimate the coefficient 
on DarkPool X Evt as negative indicating a 10 to 20 bps lower abnormal return, while Elev X Evt 
loads positive indicating a 90 to 130 bps positive abnormal return. Like my earlier analysis, results 
on abnormal returns indicates that using aggregated dark trading alone would not provide insight 
into dark pool effects and may generate erroneous inference. Dark fragmentation is associated with 
30 to 40 bps negative abnormal return, whereas lit fragmentation is tied to a 20 bps negative return 
that softens to 10 bps once FragDark variables are included. In the full specification only 
fragmentation variables retain statistical significance.  
 Conditional on market declines, dark pool volumes and fragmentation are tied to more 
negative abnormal returns. When both variables are included in the same model, only the 
relationship with fragmentation sustains. In terms of how to interpret these findings, more negative 
abnormal returns on big down days could be indicative of an overreaction, or more efficient 
incorporation of negative information. If this is due to overreaction then prices should revert on 
subsequent days generating positive abnormal returns. Conversely, if the cause is more efficient 
information incorporation then abnormal returns over subsequent periods may still be negative but 
should be less so compared to less fragmented stocks and/or stocks with lower dark pool volumes.  
To examine further, I perform an event time portfolio analysis, with the goal of isolating 
the relationship between abnormal returns and fragmentation from the relationship between 
abnormal returns and dark pool volumes. I begin by forming double sort decile portfolios and 
calculating the average abnormal returns to each portfolio on the event date and over the 
subsequent two, five, and ten trading days that follow. Portfolios are formed by sorting on pre-
period variables for each of the 43 event dates. Then I calculate returns to each event date portfolio, 
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using value-weighting or equal-weighting, and calculate the mean return across event dates per 
decile (i.e. leaving 10 portfolios). These results are presented in Table 17. Panel A presents returns 
for portfolios formed by sorting on FragDark and then DarkPool. In Panel B I present the reverse, 
sorting first on DarkPool and then on FragDark. Thus, Panel A examines the relationship between 
DarkPool and abnormal returns following an event while controlling for FragDark, and Panel B 
explores the same relationship with FragDark, controlling for DarkPool. 
If my results from regressions of abnormal returns are indicative of overreaction, then I 
expect portfolios of stocks with more volumes and fragmentation among dark pools to have 
positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) subsequent to event days. On the other hand, if 
results in Table 16 indicate more efficient incorporation of negative information, then I expect all 
portfolios to experience negative BHARs, but better relative performance from stocks with more 
volumes and fragmentation among dark pools.  
Looking at Table 17, I do not see negative BHARs across all portfolios as I would expect 
if my results in Table 16 indicate that fragmentation is tied to more efficient information 
incorporation during market stress. Additionally there is no indication of a monotonic relationship 
between fragmentation and BHARs. However, for the most fragmented portfolio of stocks in Panel 
B of Table 17, there are positive and significant BHARs (15 bps over two days, 26 bps over five 
days, and 34bps over ten days). Value-weighted returns for the same portfolio are much smaller in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant (except for a two day window when BHARs are 5 bps, 
significant at the 10% level). Therefore, returns among smaller stocks are much larger for this 
portfolio. Results from this portfolio are consistent with an overreaction story, where highly 
fragmented smaller stocks are oversold during an extreme market decline and revert in subsequent 
days. However the lack of a monotonic relationship observable in Panel B, between BHARs and 
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fragmentation, detracts from this interpretation. At the other extreme, the decile of the least 
fragmented stocks has negative abnormal returns for equal-weighted portfolios. These negative 
returns are relatively large in magnitude and highly statistically significant over a ten day interval. 
Meanwhile, value-weighted returns for this portfolio are indistinguishable from zero. Thus, in a 
portfolio of the least fragmented stocks, smaller stocks exhibit much lower returns. Results from 
this portfolio are consistent with an underreaction story, where investors underestimate the impact 
of negative information on an event day leading to negative drift in the days that follow. However, 
if the cause is structural frictions impeding information incorporation (i.e. consistent with an 
information incorporation story), we would still observe negative drift for this portfolio subsequent 
to an event day. So while results for the top and bottom deciles in Panel B are consistent with an 
overreaction/underreaction story, it is not possible to rule out an explanation based on information 
incorporation. Moreover, in the absence of any monotonic relationship between BHARs and 
fragmentation, some alternative interpretation may also be plausible.  
To summarize my findings, I find strong evidence of benefits to market quality from 
fragmentation and dark trading on days of extreme market decline. The strongest benefits come 
from fragmentation among dark pool venues. Additionally, there is clear indication that proxies 
available prior to FINRA’s transparency data initiative may generate erroneous inference 
(DarkTrd) or an incomplete picture (FragLit). Thus, my findings also highlight benefits from 
regulatory efforts to improve trading transparency. There is also some evidence that within my 
setting, dark fragmentation and dark pool volumes are associated with more negative abnormal 
returns, but I fail to find strong evidence to explain this result as either overreaction or more 
efficient information incorporation.  
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In empirical microstructure, the unobservable intentions of traders and a complex 
landscape generate concerns about simultaneity bias. For example, traders consider market quality 
when choosing where to route their orders, so it is possible that market quality outcomes and 
trading venues are determined simultaneously. The use of lagged regressors and firm fixed effects 
attempts to address these concerns. Future liquidity and volatility cannot influence prior trading 
patterns. Thus, estimating marginal effects of where a stock trades during a pre-period window on 
contemporaneous market quality variables, mitigates the simultaneity bias problem. Additionally, 
the use of firm fixed effects mitigates endogeneity from omitted variable bias (for omitted 
variables that are time invariant). However, in the next section I present results of robustness tests 
focused on these and other potential issues. 
Robustness 
To confirm my results I perform a battery of robustness tests. These efforts focus on the 
validity of the setting, event criteria, research design, and the potential of event clustering to 
confound my results. Overall, my robustness tests support my findings. 
To verify that my setting is picking up incremental effects during extreme market declines, 
I generate randomly selected placebo event dates and rerun my main regressions with this alternate 
definition of Evt. If liquidity map variables of interest (i.e. interaction terms) are generally found 
to be statistically insignificant, then falsification tests support the validity of my setting. In placebo 
regressions of effective spread, none of the interaction terms are statistically significant and 
coefficient estimates have much lower magnitudes than in Table 12 (e.g. FragDark X Evt ranges 
from 0.16 to 0.22 bps in falsification tests compared to -2.54 to -3.43 bps). Meanwhile, 
unconditional liquidity map estimates are similar to those in Table 12. In placebo tests with 
volatility as the dependent variable, interaction terms are also insignificant. Placebo tests of 
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abnormal returns also support the validity of my setting, with only one of 14 interaction terms 
across the nine model specifications is significant, and only marginally. Interestingly, beta 
estimates and t-stats on standalone liquidity map variables are similar in both placebo tests and my 
main analyses. While this falsification test demonstrates there is a difference between what I define 
as days of extreme market declines and randomly selected days, it is possible my findings are 
unique to my criteria of extreme declines. 
To determine if my findings are unique to my definition of an extreme down day on the 
market, I test three other criteria: equal-weighted CRSP returns, overnight returns to SPY (i.e. open 
price on t versus close price on t-1), and intraday returns to a value-weighted index of stocks in 
my sample (i.e. close price on t versus open price on t). Results using event criteria based on the 
CRSP equal-weighted index with regressions of effective spread, volatility, and abnormal returns 
are very similar to those obtained when using value-weighted criteria. In regressions of effective 
spread on a model including proportional and dispersion based measures, FragLit X Evt has an 
estimated beta of -1.76 (t-stat of -5.45) and FragDark X Evt has a beta of -3.30 (t-stat of -5.29). 
Using the full specification in regressions of volatility yields betas of -0.73 (t-stat of -4.56) for 
FragLit X Evt and -1.85 (t-stat of -4.17) for FragDark X Evt. Beta estimates for regressions of 
abnormal returns also generates similar inferences, having magnitudes within 10 bps compared to 
those reported in Table 13.  
Results using SPY overnight returns as event criteria in regressions of effective spread and 
volatility also agree my main results (though with increased coefficient magnitudes). For example, 
when effective spread (volatility) is the dependent variable, beta estimates are -1.76 (-1.35) for 
FragLit X Evt and -3.30 (-2.82) for FragDark X Evt. However, regressions of abnormal returns 
yields insignificant coefficients on variables of interest, except for DarkPool X Evt in models that 
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omit fragmentation. Coefficient estimates for DarkPool X Evt are 10 bps, significant at the 5% 
level when alone, and the 10% level when Elev is included.  
Results using events based on intraday value-weighted returns to my sample stocks are also 
consistent with my main analyses. In regressions of effective spread on models including 
proportional and dispersion based liquidity map variables, FragLit X Evt (FragDark X Evt) 
indicates narrower spreads by 1.27 (2.48) bps. In comparable tests with volatility as the dependent 
variable, FragLit X Evt (FragDark X Evt) has an estimated beta of -1.01 (-1.85) with a t-stat of -
5.25 (-3.59). Results for abnormal returns imply a one standard deviation increase in FragDark 
implies negative abnormal return of 30 bps (p-value < 0.01) on a big down day, though no 
statistically significant relation is found for FragLit. Overall, these tests bolster confidence that 
my results are not peculiar to a particular definition of a market decline. However, it is also worth 
verifying aspects of my research design. 
My model uses a panel setting with indicator and interaction terms to isolate incremental 
effects on big down days, however an alternative specification would be an event study setting that 
drops observations on days that are not qualifying events. To test if my results are robust to this 
dimension of my research design, I rerun my tests using only days of extreme market decline. In 
this alternative model, standalone liquidity map variables are my variables of interest, representing 
the incremental effects of fragmentation and dark trading during market stress. Within this setting, 
regressions of effective spread no longer find statistical significance among proportional variables, 
but estimates on fragmentation variables are very similar (with beta estimates of -0.83 for FragLit 
and -3.01 for FragDark, and t-stats of -2.07 and -6.68 respectively). One reason for the change in 
inferences regarding DarkPool and Elev could be reduced power (this setting loses 96.28% of 
observations). Another reason may be the inability of this model, using an event study setting, to 
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isolate unconditional effects from incremental effects of liquidity map variables on down days. In 
regressions of volatility, results for fragmentation variables are consistent (highly significant betas 
of -1.88 and -3.49 for FragLit and FragDark respectively). Coefficient estimates for DarkPool 
and Elev lose statistical significance in models that omit fragmentation. In the fully specified 
model, beta estimates indicate increased volatility from DarkPool (Elev), with a beta of 0.70 
(12.67), significant at the 5% (1%) level. In analysis of abnormal returns, only FragDark is found 
to be statistically significant, indicating an incremental effect of -10 bps (p-value < 0.01). While 
the use of a full panel in my main analysis offers more powerful tests and controls for unconditional 
relationships, my results are largely robust to an alternative event study setting. 
In addition to an event study setting, I also test alternative specifications of my panel model. 
Within the full panel, I re-run my main tests adding lags of my dependent variables. I also analyze 
a model using random effects (instead of fixed effects) with lags of my dependent variables. In all 
cases, my results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent. 
Lastly, I rerun my analysis dropping 2018 from my sample on the basis that 20 out of 43 
event dates come in late 2018 during a period of prolonged market stress. Using lagged regressors 
means that under tighter clustering of event days, there is a greater likelihood of extreme down 
days contributing to my pre-period window, potentially confounding my results. However, this 
does not appear to be the case. Results without 2018 are consistent across analysis on effective 
spread, volatility, and abnormal returns. In summary, my main findings are robust to a variety of 
alternative specifications, definitions of event criteria, and concerns event clustering. 
Chapter II Conclusion 
On days of extreme market decline, more fragmented stocks are more liquid and less 
volatile. In this setting, fragmentation among dark pools is significantly more beneficial than 
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among lit venues. During a market decline, liquidity provision is more profitable and obligatory 
market makers supply less liquidity. My results may indicate this shift in incentives induces 
competition between and within trading venues, which improves trading conditions.  
Earlier research was limited to indirect proxies of dark trading and fragmentation. Using a 
novel dataset of dark pool venue attribution from FINRA, I demonstrate that a more granular view 
into where stocks trade provides a greater understanding of the effects from dark trading and 
fragmentation. Regulatory concerns about these highly controversial facets of modern market 
structure may be misguided. If my analysis was limited to typical proxies from prior work 
(proportion of off-exchange trading and dispersion among exchange volumes), I would conclude 
that dark trading exacerbates illiquidity and volatility during market declines, and fragmentation 
among lit venues mitigates such trading conditions. However with direct measures of dark trading, 
I find dark pools have beneficial effects for liquidity and volatility. Additionally, fragmentation 
among dark pools makes stocks cheaper to trade and less erratic, and the benefits are two to three 
times those offered from lit fragmentation.  
Results on price dislocations are more difficult to interpret than results on liquidity and 
volatility. If lower abnormal returns on big down days stem from improved information 
incorporation with more fragmented stocks, then these results indicate additional benefits from 
fragmentation, particularly among dark pools. However, if these lower abnormal returns are 
actually indicative of more fragile prices among more fragmented stocks, then these results offer 
a caveat to the benefits of dark trading and fragmentation. Overall I find some evidence consistent 
with investors overreacting to negative news for more fragmented stocks on days of extreme 
market decline.  
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Disaggregating dark trading volumes into individual market segments and venues allows 
researchers to tie investment outcomes to individual market mechanisms and counterparties. Given 
the disagreement in inference drawn from aggregated dark volumes versus more granular data, my 
results motivate subsequent work to isolate the effects of segments within elevator markets. HFT 
internalization and upstairs trading represent very different matching mechanisms and 
counterparties. Additional work is necessary to isolate the effects of these types of trading so 
regulators, practitioners, and academics can provide well informed policy prescriptions with the 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description Source 
Amihud Amihud illiquidity is calculated as the absolute value of return on day t, divided by value traded on day t. CRSP, TAQ 
CRSP 
(EW) 
The daily return of the CRSP equal-weighted index. CRSP 
CRSP 
(VW) 
The daily return of the CRSP value-weighted index. CRSP 
DarkTrd Dollar value traded in undisplayed markets (identified in TAQ as execution destination equals 'D'), divided 
by total consolidated dollar value traded. Measure is at the stock day level using all trades executed during 
the regular trading session. When used as a regressor, it is aggregated over a given event pre-period, and 
normalized to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
TAQ 
DarkPool Calculated as total shares traded across all dark pool ("ATS") venues scaled by total share volume, measured 
per stock week. When used as a regressor, it is aggregated over a given event pre-period, and normalized 
to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
FINRA, 
TAQ 
Depth Dollar value of trading interest at the NBBO, calculated as an average of dollar value quoted at the NBB 
and the NBO. 
TAQ 
Elev "Elevator" volumes are calculated as total shares traded across dark venues that are not registered ATS 
venues scaled by total share volume, measured per stock week. When used as a regressor, it is aggregated 
over a given event pre-period, and normalized to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
FINRA, 
TAQ 
ES Effective spread. Calculated as the absolute value of twice the difference between execution price and the 
prevailing midpoint (trades exempt from RegNMS rule 611 are excluded). Dollar-weighted averages are 
calculated for each stock-day. Expressed either in dollars or as a percentage scaled by the prevailing 
midpoint. 
TAQ 
ESLag The average daily ES during the pre-event window. TAQ 
Evt An indicator variable equal to one on days where the return to the CRSP value-weighted index is below 
two standard deviations of the mean over the sample period, June 16th, 2014 through December 31st, 
2018. 
CRSP 
Frag The inverse of a Herfindalh measure of market share concentration among exchanges and ATS venues. 
Market share per venue is assessed on a stock-week basis.  When used as a regressor, it is aggregated over 





Variable Description Source 
FragDark 
The inverse of a Herfindalh measure of market share concentration among ATS venues only. Market 
share per venue is assessed on a stock-week basis.  When used as a regressor, it is aggregated over a 
given event pre-period, and normalized to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
FINRA 
FragLit 
The inverse of a Herfindalh measure of market share concentration among exchange venues only. 
Market share per venue is assessed on a stock-week basis.  When used as a regressor, it is aggregated 
over a given event pre-period, and normalized to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
TAQ 
MktCap Market capitalization is the product of shares outstanding and daily closing price, for pre-period 
evaluations, I use market capitalization available from CRSP on the first day a stock trades during a given 
event pre-period. When used as a regressor, I take the natural log. 
CRSP 
NYSE Dummy variable set to one if a stock is listed on the NYSE on the first day the stock trades during a given 
event pre-period. 
CRSP 
PI Price impact. Calculated as a buy/sell indicator multiplied by twice the difference between execution 
price and prevailing midpoint thirty seconds after the trade. Dollar-weighted averages are calculated for 
each stock-day. Expressed either in dollars or as a percentage scaled by the prevailing midpoint at the 
time of execution. 
TAQ 
PILag The average daily PI during the pre-event window. TAQ 
QS Quoted spread. Calculated as the NBO minus NBB, for each consolidated quote observed. Time-
weighted averages are computed for each-stock day. Expressed either in dollars or as a percentage scaled 
by the prevailing midpoint. 
TAQ 
Ret (raw) Daily raw returns taken from CRSP's daily file CRSP 
RS Realized spread. Calculated as a buy/sell indicator multiplied by twice the difference between midpoints 
thirty seconds after the trade and the prevailing midpoint at execution time. Dollar-weighted averages are 
calculated for each stock-day. Expressed either in dollars or as a percentage scaled by the prevailing 
midpoint at the time of execution. 
TAQ 
RSLag The average daily RS during the pre-event window. TAQ 







Variable Description Source 
Trds Count of number of executions. TAQ 
TrdSz Dollar value executed scaled by number of trades executed, measured at a stock day level , scaled by 
1,000 when used in regression analysis. 
TAQ 




Volatility Proxied using the daily mean per stock of standard deviations of intraday returns, where intraday returns 
are the rate of return between each consequetive trade (excluding trades exempt from RegNMS rule 611). 
Scaled by 10,000 for readability when used in regressions. 
TAQ 
VolatilityLag The average daily Volatility during the pre-event window. TAQ 
VWAP Volume weighted average prices are calculated using all executions during the regular trading session, 
















Figure 6. Cross Sectional Variation in Dark Trading 
Diagrams illustrating the granularity provided by FINRAs dark trading transparency data. Panel A presents pie charts of market shares for dark (lit) venues in 
































































































































































Appendix C: Chapter II Tables  
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All 36.26% 14.97% 23.22%         14.49           3.52           8.85 
Size            
1 37.58% 13.39% 27.38%         11.96           3.21           7.15 
2 29.50% 17.40% 15.73%         16.41           3.65           9.63 
3 28.17% 17.56% 14.12%         17.74           3.88         10.05 
4 27.71% 17.42% 13.91%         18.26           3.98         10.32 
5 27.10% 15.39% 15.60%         18.72           3.99         10.83 
       
       
Panel B N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Stock Traits:       
MktCap (M)          4,129      5,998.96       25,263.08        204.51        763.38     2,880.72 
NYSE          4,129            0.37              0.48 0 0 1
Price          4,129          34.85             48.05           9.50         20.80         43.66 
Trds (k)          4,129            7.01             13.73           0.68           2.57           7.45 
TrdVal (M)          4,129          53.08           184.84           1.22           7.55         36.04 
Turnover          4,129          0.010             0.021         0.004         0.006         0.011 
Market Quality:      
ES (bps)          4,129          46.39             64.50           7.09         17.96         54.64 
ES ($)          4,129          0.071             0.103         0.018         0.036         0.076 
QS (bps)          4,129          73.39             97.66         13.18         32.23         87.98 
QS ($)          4,129          0.123             0.174         0.032         0.064         0.132 
PI (bps)          4,129          16.18             14.06           5.73         11.66         22.24 
RS (bps)          4,129          29.11             49.82           1.06           5.44         32.04 
Volatility          4,126  0.30% 0.50% 0.04% 0.11% 0.32%
              
This table reports summary statistics for dark trading and fragmentation variables by NYSE 
market capitalization quintile, from smallest to largest stocks. Panel A presents mean values for 
dark trading and fragmentation per quintiles formed on market capitalization using breakpoints 
from NYSE listed stocks. Panel B presents descriptive statistics on stock traits and market 
quality over the full sample. Spread and volatility measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 












Table 10. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
ES (bps)   43      39.22        4.20     37.15      39.10     41.00  
ES ($)   43      0.079      0.012     0.069      0.077     0.088  
QS (bps)   43      67.91      22.45     59.28      64.09     69.59  
QS ($)   43      0.150      0.052     0.117      0.125     0.181  
PI (bps)   43      15.01        1.75     14.29      14.80     15.64  
RS (bps)   43      23.20        2.69     21.68      23.20     24.60  
Vol   43    0.24%      0.03%    0.22%    0.23%    0.26%  
Ret (raw)   43  -2.29% 0.64% -2.69% -2.16% -1.80% 
CRSP (VW)   43  -1.93% 0.54% -2.32% -1.88% -1.58% 
CRSP (EW)   43  -2.30% 0.61% -2.59% -2.09% -1.88% 
       
        
Panel B N ES (bps) ES ($) 
QS 
(bps) QS ($) Volatility Ret (raw) 
2014 3 39.10 0.068 58.12 0.109 0.23% -2.10% 
2015 9 40.97 0.076 62.01 0.123 0.25% -2.23% 
2016 10 37.63 0.067 60.89 0.115 0.24% -2.59% 
2017 1 35.06 0.066 55.77 0.117 0.19% -2.40% 
2018 20 39.47 0.090 76.15 0.188 0.24% -2.19% 
                
 
This table reports summary statistics on event dates during the sample period, May 12, 2014 
through December 31, 2018. Events are defined as dates when returns to the CRSP value-weighted 
index are below two standard deviations from the sample period mean. Panel A presents statistics 
aggregated across event dates. Panel B presents means of these statistics per year. All variables are 
measured at the daily level, spreads and volatility are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 





































(bps) Amihud Volatility 
Mkt 
Cap NYSE Trds 
Trd 
Val Turnover 
FragLit 0.76                 
FragDark 0.65 0.45                
DarkTrd -0.21 -0.01 -0.21               
DarkPool 0.40 0.33 0.42 0.11              
Elev -0.42 -0.25 -0.39 0.73 -0.44  
       
    
ES (bps) -0.50 -0.32 -0.58 0.39 -0.34 0.48            
QS (bps) -0.50 -0.33 -0.58 0.35 -0.33 0.44 0.88           
PI (bps) -0.32 -0.18 -0.36 0.29 -0.19 0.33 0.53 0.51          
RS (bps) -0.45 -0.29 -0.52 0.33 -0.31 0.42 0.91 0.80 0.19         
Amihud -0.13 -0.09 -0.15 0.09 -0.10 0.12 0.26 0.25 0.15 0.23        
Volatility -0.52 -0.34 -0.59 0.38 -0.34 0.47 0.86 0.84 0.46 0.79 0.23       
MktCap 0.15 0.08 0.18 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13      
NYSE 0.65 0.60 0.29 -0.28 0.12 -0.32 -0.30 -0.30 -0.25 -0.25 -0.06 -0.31 0.14     
Trds 0.27 0.22 0.29 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.20 -0.21 -0.19 -0.16 -0.03 -0.21 0.68 0.18    
TrdVal 0.13 0.09 0.15 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 0.77 0.10 0.85   
Turnover 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01  
VWAP 0.15 0.06 0.13 -0.26 0.07 -0.24 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.16 -0.05 -0.19 0.26 0.19 0.15 0.27 -0.01 
                                    
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for variables within the pooled sample. Spreads and volatility are winsorized at the 










Table 12. Impact of Dark Trading and Fragmentation on Effective Spread on Days with Extreme Negative Market Returns 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
DarkTrd X Evt 1.820 ***                 
(0.481)                 
DarkPool X Evt   -1.850***   -1.578***         -0.201 
  (0.351)   (0.323)         (0.242) 
Elev X Evt     6.423** 4.195*         3.987 
    (3.082) (2.309)         (2.434) 
Frag X Evt         -3.043 ***         
         (0.512)          
FragLit X Evt           -2.459***   -1.144*** -1.051*** 
          (0.419)   (0.248) (0.248) 
FragDark X Evt             -3.426*** -2.826*** -2.538*** 
            (0.619) (0.549) (0.510) 
DarkTrd -0.525***                 
(0.149)                 
DarkPool   -0.218*   -0.238**         0.066 
  (0.115)   (0.115)         (0.114) 
Elev     -0.473 -0.516         -0.613 
    (0.437) (0.449)         (0.633) 
Frag         -1.478 ***         
         (0.146)          
FragLit           -0.330**   0.103 0.080 
          (0.149)   (0.149) (0.159) 
FragDark             -2.365*** -2.396*** -2.416*** 
            (0.147) (0.153) (0.147) 
Evt 3.385*** 3.350*** 3.349*** 3.357*** 3.324 *** 3.495*** 3.246*** 3.317*** 3.329*** 
 (0.654)
 (0.617) (0.627) (0.617) (0.648)  (0.647) (0.630) (0.635) (0.634) 
Mktcap -7.448*** -7.301*** -7.288*** -7.316*** -6.947 *** -7.247*** -7.346*** -7.348*** -7.360*** 
 (0.776)
 (0.771) (0.771) (0.771) (0.760)  (0.770) (0.753) (0.751) (0.752) 
Price -2.628*** -2.554*** -2.554*** -2.558*** -2.862 *** -2.650*** -2.436*** -2.432*** -2.444*** 
 (0.770)
 (0.773) (0.773) (0.773) (0.769)  (0.772) (0.764) (0.762) (0.761) 
TrdSz 0.126*** 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.103 *** 0.113*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 
 (0.030)





Table 12, continued. 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
Turnover -19.320*** -19.418*** -19.398*** -19.412*** -19.135 *** -19.299*** -18.868*** -18.890*** -18.869*** 
 (3.210) (3.236) (3.239) (3.233) (3.189) (3.215) (3.071) (3.074) (3.069) 
CRSP (VW) 1.013 1.211 1.270 1.182 1.538  1.321 1.107 1.034 0.956 
 (15.541)
 (15.609) (15.586)  (15.610) (15.616) (15.647) (15.950) (15.960) (15.967)
VolatilityLag 0.697*** 0.695*** 0.696*** 0.695*** 0.689 *** 0.694*** 0.700*** 0.700*** 0.701*** 
 (0.019)
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Firm FEs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,398,451 3,398,451 3,398,451 3,398,451 3,398,451  3,398,451 3,390,551 3,390,551 3,390,551 
R-squared 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.710  0.710 0.711 0.711 0.711 
                                      
  
  
This table reports estimates for regressions of effective spread on variables describing a stock’s liquidity map, an indicator variable 
(Evt) equal to one on event dates and zero otherwise, interaction terms, and control variables. Events are defined as dates when returns 
to the CRSP value-weighted index are below two standard deviations from the sample period mean. Interaction terms are the variables 
of interest, calculated by multiplying Evt by liquidity map variables describing dark trading and trading dispersion. Liquidity map 
variables are normalized to mean zero with standard deviation of one. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. Spreads and volatility 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 














Table 13. Impact of Dark Trading and Fragmentation on Price Impact on Days with Extreme Negative Market Returns 
 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
DarkTrd X Evt 0.477***                 
(0.172)                 
DarkPool X Evt   -0.391***   -0.332***         -0.027 
  (0.138)   (0.123)         (0.104) 
Elev X Evt     1.372* 0.909         1.310* 
    (0.783) (0.606)         (0.704) 
Frag X Evt         -0.737 ***         
         (0.187)          
FragLit X Evt           -0.548***   -0.268** -0.246** 
          (0.155)   (0.113) (0.113) 
FragDark X Evt             -0.729*** -0.603*** -0.522*** 
            (0.213) (0.192) (0.184) 
DarkTrd -0.393***                 
(0.055)                 
DarkPool   0.146***   0.131***         -0.004 
  (0.046)   (0.047)         (0.046) 
Elev     -0.567* -0.506         -1.088*** 
    (0.340) (0.314)         (0.419) 
Frag         0.349 ***         
         (0.054)          
FragLit           0.686***   0.733*** 0.725*** 
          (0.061)   (0.063) (0.066) 
FragDark             -0.178*** -0.313*** -0.313*** 
            (0.065) (0.067) (0.064) 
Evt 1.663*** 1.663*** 1.662*** 1.665*** 1.670 *** 1.656*** 1.659*** 1.637*** 1.642*** 
 (0.303)
 (0.296) (0.298) (0.297) (0.298)  (0.300) (0.294) (0.294) (0.295) 
Mktcap -2.256*** -2.111*** -2.138*** -2.128*** -2.183 *** -2.165*** -2.154*** -2.212*** -2.244*** 
 (0.238)
 (0.238) (0.238) (0.238) (0.236)  (0.236) (0.233) (0.230) (0.230) 
Price -2.109*** -2.041*** -2.048*** -2.047*** -1.986 *** -1.919*** -2.063*** -1.930*** -1.954*** 
 (0.263)
 (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.262)  (0.259) (0.262) (0.257) (0.256) 
TrdSz 0.027** 0.020* 0.020* 0.021* 0.022 * 0.024** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
 (0.012)





Table 13, continued. 
 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
Turnover 3.743*** 3.680*** 3.678*** 3.691*** 3.605 *** 3.498*** 3.702*** 3.533*** 3.562*** 
 (1.067)
 (1.054) (1.055) (1.055) (1.041)  (1.010) (1.058) (1.012) (1.016) 
VolatilityLag 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.082 *** 0.083 *** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.083 *** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
 (0.004)
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm FEs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,397,917 3,397,917 3,397,917  3,397,917  3,397,917 3,397,917 3,390,060  3,390,060 3,390,060 
R-squared 0.314 0.314 0.314  0.314  0.314 0.314 0.317  0.317 0.317 
                                      
 
This table reports estimates for regressions of price impact on variables describing a stock’s liquidity map, an indicator variable (Evt) 
equal to one on event dates and zero otherwise, interaction terms, and control variables. Events are defined as dates when returns to the 
CRSP value-weighted index are below two standard deviations from the sample period mean. Interaction terms are the variables of 
interest, calculated by multiplying Evt by liquidity map variables describing dark trading and trading dispersion. Liquidity map variables 
are normalized to mean zero with standard deviation of one. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. Spreads and volatility are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 




















Table 14. Impact of Dark Trading and Fragmentation on Realized Spread on Days with Extreme Negative Market Returns 
 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
DarkTrd X Evt 1.135 ***                 
(0.360)                  
DarkPool X Evt   -1.271***   -1.098***         -0.171 
  (0.260)   (0.248)         (0.193) 
Elev X Evt     4.204* 2.650         1.562 
    (2.342) (1.834)         (2.258) 
Frag X Evt         -2.011***         
         (0.404)         
FragLit X Evt           -1.657***   -0.752*** -0.696*** 
          (0.287)   (0.154) (0.158) 
FragDark X Evt             -2.369*** -1.959*** -1.812*** 
            (0.454) (0.418) (0.383) 
DarkTrd 0.130                  
(0.123)                  
DarkPool   -0.284***   -0.278***         0.187** 
  (0.090)   (0.089)         (0.090) 
Elev     0.403 0.331         1.221** 
    (0.280) (0.254)         (0.518) 
Frag         -1.887***         
         (0.120)         
FragLit           -1.100***   -0.722*** -0.762*** 
          (0.117)   (0.116) (0.124) 
FragDark             -2.153*** -2.031*** -2.071*** 
            (0.117) (0.119) (0.115) 
Evt 1.481 *** 1.444*** 1.443*** 1.448*** 1.410*** 1.587*** 1.345*** 1.435*** 1.440*** 
 (0.412) 
 (0.392) (0.394) (0.391) (0.424) (0.412) (0.422) (0.424) (0.422) 
Mktcap -5.486 *** -5.569*** -5.526*** -5.556*** -5.141*** -5.463*** -5.571*** -5.509*** -5.457*** 
 (0.584) 
 (0.580) (0.580) (0.581) (0.569) (0.579) (0.566) (0.565) (0.565) 
Price -0.244  -0.285 -0.274 -0.277 -0.655 -0.515 -0.186 -0.330 -0.307 
 (0.571) 
 (0.573) (0.573) (0.573) (0.569) (0.574) (0.565) (0.566) (0.565) 
TrdSz 0.094 *** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.101*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 
 (0.023) 





Table 14, continued. 
 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
Turnover -22.685*** -22.659 *** -22.651*** -22.671*** -22.299*** -22.347*** -22.161*** -21.993*** -21.999*** 
 (3.449) (3.430) (3.439) (3.433) (3.353) (3.350) (3.278) (3.230) (3.236) 
CRSP (VW) -0.295 -0.677  -0.529 -0.625 -0.439 -0.609 -1.185 -1.235 -1.120 
 (9.076)
 (9.107)  (9.089) (9.101) (9.251) (9.209) (9.476) (9.530) (9.508) 
VolatilityLag 0.574*** 0.574 *** 0.575*** 0.574*** 0.566 *** 0.570*** 0.577 *** 0.575*** 0.574*** 
 (0.015)
 (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Firm FEs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 
         
3,397,917  
         
3,397,917  
          
3,397,917   
          
3,397,917   
         
3,397,917  
         
3,397,917  
         
3,390,060  
         
3,390,060  
          
3,390,060   
R-squared 0.586  0.586  0.586  0.586  0.586  0.586  0.586  0.586  0.586  
                                      
 
This table reports estimates for regressions of realized spread on variables describing a stock’s liquidity map, an indicator variable (Evt) 
equal to one on event dates and zero otherwise, interaction terms, and control variables. Events are defined as dates when returns to the 
CRSP value-weighted index are below two standard deviations from the sample period mean. Interaction terms are the variables of 
interest, calculated by multiplying Evt by liquidity map variables describing dark trading and trading dispersion. Liquidity map variables 
are normalized to mean zero with standard deviation of one. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. Spreads and volatility are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
















Table 15. Impact of Dark Trading and Fragmentation on Volatility on Days with Extreme Negative Market Returns 
 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
DarkTrd X Evt 1.032***                 
(0.328)                 
DarkPool X Evt   -1.206***   -0.958 **         0.268 
  (0.297)   (0.377)          (0.234) 
Elev X Evt     5.977  3.942          4.916** 
    (4.832)  (4.486)          (2.112) 
Frag X Evt         -2.366***         
         (0.462)         
FragLit X Evt           -1.954***   -0.931*** -0.922*** 
          (0.352)   (0.162) (0.178) 
FragDark X Evt             -2.782*** -2.264*** -2.086*** 
            (0.621) (0.556) (0.522) 
DarkTrd 0.754***                 
(0.110)                 
DarkPool   -0.487***   -0.425 ***         0.314*** 
  (0.093)   (0.099)          (0.091) 
Elev     2.817 * 2.564 *         6.187*** 
    (1.501)  (1.398)          (1.101) 
Frag         -2.651***         
         (0.134)         
FragLit           -1.818***   -1.346*** -1.375*** 
          (0.123)   (0.119) (0.125) 
FragDark             -2.788*** -2.545*** -2.613*** 
            (0.136) (0.136) (0.131) 
Evt 3.364*** 3.316*** 3.314 *** 3.326 *** 3.281*** 3.514*** 3.245*** 3.374*** 3.382*** 
 (0.582)
 (0.573) (0.573)  (0.575)  (0.631) (0.631) (0.606) (0.634) (0.626) 
Mktcap -9.145*** -9.481*** -9.343 *** -9.383 *** -8.754*** -9.236*** -9.591*** -9.428*** -9.190*** 
 (0.704)
 (0.703) (0.704)  (0.704)  (0.678) (0.696) (0.685) (0.682) (0.680) 
Price 0.186 0.017 0.080  0.078  -0.464 -0.336 0.262 0.004 0.172 
 (0.675)
 (0.679) (0.678)  (0.678)  (0.664) (0.676) (0.668) (0.667) (0.663) 
TrdSz 0.125*** 0.143*** 0.135 *** 0.130 *** 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.074*** 
 (0.027)





Table 15, continued. 
 
    Model      
 1 2  3 4  5 6 7 8 9 
Turnover -18.936*** -18.808*** -18.844 *** -18.865*** -18.192 *** -18.238*** -18.279*** -17.933*** -18.037*** 
 (3.645) (3.583) (3.608) (3.600) (3.450) (3.442) (3.404) (3.313) (3.349) 
CRSP (VW) 12.574 11.503 11.878  11.708 11.579  11.460 11.063 10.907 11.426 
 (12.259)
 (12.365) (12.274)  (12.336) (12.542)  (12.791) (12.896) (13.195) (13.099) 
Firm FEs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,346,277 3,346,277 3,346,277 3,346,277  3,346,277 3,346,277 3,341,442  3,341,442 3,341,442  
R-squared 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.661  0.662 0.662 0.663  0.663 0.664  
                                      
 
 
This table reports estimates for regressions of volatility on variables describing a stock’s liquidity map, an indicator variable (Evt) equal 
to one on event dates and zero otherwise, interaction terms, and control variables. Events are defined as dates when returns to the CRSP 
value-weighted index are below two standard deviations from the sample period mean. Interaction terms are the variables of interest, 
calculated by multiplying Evt by liquidity map variables describing dark trading and trading dispersion. Liquidity map variables are 
normalized to mean zero with standard deviation of one. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. Spreads and volatility are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 



















Table 16. Impact of Dark Trading and Fragmentation on Abnormal Returns on Days with Extreme Negative Market Returns 
 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
DarkTrd X Evt 0.001***                 
(0.000)                 
DarkPool X Evt   -0.002***   -0.001***         0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)         (0.000) 
Elev X Evt     0.013 *** 0.009***         0.000 
    (0.002)  (0.003)         (0.003) 
Frag X Evt         -0.003***         
         (0.000)         
FragLit X Evt           -0.002***   -0.001*** -0.001*** 
          (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
FragDark X Evt             -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DarkTrd 0.000***                 
(0.000)                 
DarkPool   0.000   0.000         0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)         (0.000) 
Elev     -0.001 *** -0.001***         -0.001* 
    (0.000)  (0.000)         (0.000) 
Frag         0.000         
         (0.000)         
FragLit           0.000   0.000* 0.000 
          (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
FragDark             0.000 0.000 0.000 
            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Evt 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 *** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000)
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mktcap -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 * -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000)
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Price -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002 *** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000)
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TrdSz 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 *** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000)





Table 16, continued. 
Model 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
Turnover 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094 *** 0.094*** 0.094 *** 0.094*** 0.094 *** 0.094*** 0.094*** 
 (0.015)
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015) 
VolatilityLag 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)





























5 3,025,720 3,025,720 3,025,720 
R-squared 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 
                                      
 
This table reports estimates for regressions of DGTW abnormal returns on variables describing a stock’s liquidity map, an indicator 
variable (Evt) equal to one on event dates and zero otherwise, interaction terms, and control variables. Events are defined as dates when 
returns to the CRSP value-weighted index are below two standard deviations from the sample period mean. Interaction terms are the 
variables of interest, calculated by multiplying Evt by liquidity map variables describing dark trading and trading dispersion. Liquidity 
map variables are normalized to mean zero with standard deviation of one. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. Spreads and volatility 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate significance at the 0.10, 

















Table 17. Impact of Dark Trading and Fragmentation on Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns Following Days with Extreme 






  Raw Ret 
 (VW) 
BHAR [1,2]  
(VW) 
BHAR [1,5]  
(VW) 








BHAR [1,10]  
(EW) 
1 8.54 8.05% -2.29% 0.04% 0.12% 0.13% -2.35% -0.04%  0.06% 0.03% 
2 8.63 10.45% -2.41% -0.03% -0.02% -0.04% -2.27% 0.00%  0.02% -0.09% 
3 8.69 11.86% -2.37% -0.05% -0.02% -0.03% -2.26% -0.01%  -0.08% -0.18%*** 
4 8.73 13.07% -2.40% 0.01% 0.08% 0.15% -2.30% -0.05%  -0.02% -0.02% 
5 8.76 14.22% -2.48% 0.06% 0.13% 0.05% -2.31% 0.02%  0.00% -0.08% 
6 8.78 14.77% -2.34% -0.04% -0.09% -0.17% -2.28% 0.06%  0.02% 0.00% 
7 8.81 16.72% -2.46% -0.01% -0.16%** -0.35%*** -2.28% -0.05%  -0.23%*** -0.37%*** 
8 8.82 18.30% -2.38% 0.07% 0.01% -0.03% -2.30% 0.00%  -0.15%** -0.23%*** 
9 8.82 20.53% -2.48% 0.02% -0.08% -0.23%** -2.32% -0.02%  -0.12%* -0.24%*** 
10 8.81 25.88% -2.43% -0.02% -0.17% -0.42%*** -2.29% -0.06%  -0.14% -0.38%** 




     Dark  
     Pool 
  Raw Ret 
    (VW) 
BHAR [1,2]  
(VW) 
BHAR [1,5]  
(VW) 
BHAR [1,10]  
(VW) 
Raw Ret  
(EW) 
BHAR [1,2]  
(EW) 
BHAR [1,5]  
(EW) 
BHAR [1,10]  
(EW) 
1 5.03 15.54% -2.07% 0.06% -0.08% -0.27% -1.59% -0.10%  -0.30%* -0.64%*** 
2 6.76 15.40% -2.29% 0.02% 0.13% -0.04% -1.97% -0.03%  -0.15% -0.38%*** 
3 7.57 15.36% -2.43% 0.00% -0.01% -0.22%* -2.13% -0.01%  -0.08% -0.16% 
4 8.15 15.35% -2.46% -0.01% -0.18%* -0.28%** -2.22% 0.00%  -0.12%** -0.27%*** 
5 8.65 15.38% -2.41% -0.03% -0.10% -0.08% -2.28% -0.02%  -0.11%** -0.15%** 
6 9.12 15.43% -2.45% 0.03% -0.05% 0.02% -2.42% -0.03%  -0.05% -0.12% 
7 9.59 15.45% -2.35% -0.04% -0.09% -0.22% -2.45% -0.06% ** -0.09%* -0.14%* 
8 10.09 15.47% -2.40% 0.01% 0.18%*** 0.30%*** -2.54% 0.02%  0.05% 0.00% 
9 10.69 15.53% -2.35% -0.08%** -0.06% -0.09% -2.61% -0.04%  -0.05% -0.05% 
10 11.71 15.55% -2.38% 0.05%* 0.04% -0.02% -2.77% 0.15% ** 0.26%** 0.34%*** 
This table reports mean values for fragmentation among dark pools, dark pool proportional volumes, raw event date returns, and buy-
and-hold abnormal returns over various time intervals following event dates. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated over two, 
five, and ten day intervals subsequent to a given event date. Panel A presents these statistics by deciles formed by sorting stocks first on 
FragDark, and then DarkPool, on each event date. Panel B presents the same statistics for deciles formed by sorting stocks first on 






Table 17, continued. 
 
calculated on a value-weighted (VW) or equal-weighted (EW) basis for a given decile of stocks on a given event date, and then equally 
weighted across event dates. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. Statistical significance is denoted by *, **, and *** to indicate 







In this dissertation, I examine two highly controversial facets of modern market structure, 
dark trading and fragmentation. Research in this area has employed an array of statistical 
techniques to address the endogeneity that arises from a complex trading landscape. My 
contribution is made possible by leveraging opportunities provided by regulatory initiatives. 
Rather than using statistical corrections for endogeneity, my research relies on exogenous 
regulatory shocks and novel data for causal identification. 
My first essay explores the effects of aggregate dark trading volumes on market quality for 
typical trading sessions. Empirically, we use the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Tick 
Size Pilot Program to isolate a pilot provision which generates a significant negative exogenous 
shock to dark trading. Several earlier studies find strong positive effects on liquidity from dark 
trading, and several others find the opposite. However, in the presence of a large exogenous shock 
to dark trading, we find no significant impact on liquidity or price efficiency. These findings 
suggest regulatory concern may be misguided, given restrictions on dark trading in many 
developed markets. 
In my second essay, I study how dark trading and fragmentation affect stock resiliency. 
There is a mature literature focused on how different economic agents explain cross sectional 
variation in how individual stocks fare during times of market stress. However, we know 
comparatively little about the direct effects from market structure in this setting. One reason for 
this gap in the literature was a lack of data about dark trading and fragmentation to investigate 
empirically. However, in a recent effort to increase transparency in dark trading, the Financial 





executions in dark trading venues. My empirical strategy identifies days of extreme market decline 
and uses FINRA’s dark trading data to explain dislocations to liquidity, volatility, and price in the 
cross section. Contrary to inferences obtained using proxies available before FINRA’s dark trading 
data, I find that stocks with greater dark pool volumes and fragmentation have relatively higher 
liquidity, lower volatility, and steeper price declines during a large down day on the market. My 
results offer evidence of benefits from dark trading and fragmentation that contradict concerns that 
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